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THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S 
LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY 
TOWARDS MOBILITY OR INSECURITY PARTNERSHIPS? 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 321/OCTOBER 2009 
SERGIO CARRERA AND RAÜL HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA
* 
1. Introduction 
This paper looks at the dynamics affecting the external dimensions of the EU’s labour 
immigration policy. It assesses the role and functions of mobility partnerships as a mechanism 
for governing circular migration schemes that allow the temporary movement of individuals for 
employment purposes between interested EU member states and third countries. The paper 
considers the implications of these partnerships for the liberty and security of the third-country 
workers as well as the coherency of the EU’s immigration policy. 
Originating in a Franco–German initiative for a new ‘European migration policy’ in 2006, and 
then transferred to the EU’s ‘global approach to migration’, mobility partnerships are now 
presented at the EU official level as a key and most promising policy tool for the integration of 
labour migration measures into the EU’s external relations. Two mobility partnerships have 
been launched so far as pilot projects – with Moldova and Cape Verde in May 2008. The 
European Commission has just published a preliminary evaluation of the pilot phase of the 
mobility partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde (September 2009), in which it qualifies 
these instruments as “the most innovative and sophisticated tool to date of the Global Approach 
to Migration”.
1 Mobility partnerships constitute joint declarations negotiated between the 
Commission (based on political guidelines from the Council and on behalf of a group of 
interested EU member states) and a third country, under the condition that the latter has shown a 
strong commitment to cooperate with the EU on the management of irregular migration flows. 
The official goal purported by the European Commission for the mobility partnerships appears 
to be that of moving beyond EU policy priorities that focus exclusively on the security concerns 
associated with human mobility and borders. Instead, the priority is on a new framework 
facilitating regular channels for the temporary and ‘circular’ mobility of persons between the 
signatories’ states for various purposes (including work), and allowing for a triple win for the 
member states, the non-EU state and third-country nationals (TCNs).  
This paper challenges these assumptions and argues that from the perspective of labour 
migration policy, mobility partnerships rather constitute ‘security partnerships’ for the 
participating states (especially for EU member states but to a certain extent also for the selected 
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(CEPS), Brussels. Raül Hernández i Sagrera is a Research Fellow at the Observatori de Política Exterior 
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on 25 September 2009. The authors would like to thank the participants of the workshop for their input 
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third countries). The reason they are security partnerships for EU member states is not just 
because their origins and prevailing emphasis continues to be on security (the control of 
irregular migration through readmission agreements, border controls, the security of travel 
documents, the exchange of information among law enforcement authorities and capacity 
building for migration management). The kind of labour immigration policy they present is 
fundamentally driven by economic interests, the perceived labour market and needs/demands of 
the participating EU member states. This favours a policy facilitating the mobility of only those 
TCNs who are deemed ‘useful’ or profitable for the economic security of the receiving state 
because of their skills, competences or capacity to fill labour market shortages. Thus, mobility 
partnerships are also ‘insecurity partnerships’ for TCNs and the very coherency of the EU’s 
labour immigration policy. 
Meanwhile, the sovereignty of EU member states also remains largely untouched and therefore 
very much secured. The Directorate-General for Freedom, Security and Justice (DG JFS) of the 
European Commission only plays a coordinating role in the negotiations. The interests of third 
states are also at the heart of the rationale behind these instruments, although their interests are 
placed in a secondary position compared with those of the EU member states. This is evident 
when looking at the conditionality or levels of commitment that third countries will need to 
demonstrate to the European Community (EC) to benefit from the regime envisaged by the 
partnerships. They receive EC funding for implementation and are generally eager to regain 
their human capital (national workers). Hence, third states show great interest in issues related 
to the mobility partnerships and discussions on circular migration – presented at the EU official 
level as promoting their development and mitigating the adverse effects of brain drain.  
Furthermore, mobility partnerships cannot be comprehensively understood from a purely state-
centric approach. The role that other intergovernmental actors (such as the International 
Organisation for Migration, IOM) have played since their inception has been prominent. 
Consequently, mobility partnerships offer security to all those actors involved in the 
implementation of EU and member state immigration policies that receive substantial funding 
for their activities in this context. 
Whose security and mobility are at the centre of mobility partnerships? These agreements 
represent insecurity partnerships for TCNs for three main reasons. First, the kind of labour 
mobility they provide falls under the concept of ‘circular migration’, which has been defined by 
the Commission as a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal 
mobility back and forth between two countries. Mobility partnerships advocate a normative 
framing of the phenomenon of migration driven by the public policy ambition of controlling the 
human movements of foreigners in a way that prevents their social settlement, permanent 
residence and social integration. Instead, mobility partnerships promote a form of management 
destined to keep migration temporary and even circular, based on a utilitarian logic of selecting 
those movements that serve the financial and labour market interests of participating states. 
TCNs are not treated as workers and human rights holders, but as economic units at the service 
of the demand and supply of participating states. Mobility partnerships leave the liberty and 
security of the individual subject to these new policy processes and fail to acknowledge the 
unexpected sociology surrounding any act of human mobility beyond narrow policies 
pretending to manage it in a circular or temporary fashion. Mobility partnerships conceive 
migration as something seasonal. The management strategy predicated by mobility partnerships 
is one implementing temporary and selective labour migration policies, in which ‘return’ is a 
crucial aspect. The concept of circular migration developed at the EU level cannot succeed 
without effective policies ensuring that the return or readmission of the third-country workers 
actually takes place after the expiration of the legality of stay and work (residence and work 
permits). This is yet another reason justifying the obsession of mobility partnerships and circular 
migration debates with return and non-settlement. The circularity of the regime adds even more THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY | 3 
 
precarity to the migrant worker’s security of residence and access to rights under a system that 
inevitably leads to expulsion from the EU. 
Second, mobility partnerships are also insecurity partnerships for the individual in light of the 
general principle of legal certainty in EC law and more broadly that of the rule of law, which 
constitutes one of the foundations upon which the EC legal system has been built. Mobility 
partnerships have been presented as joint declarations and thus they fall within the category of 
‘soft law’. This means that they are policy instruments lacking any legally binding or 
enforceable nature upon participating member states. The partnerships offer a shopping list of 
projects, political priorities and bilateral agreements practised by each participating member 
state, which makes it difficult to ensure the certainty and legal security of the individual subject 
to these transnational policies. The soft juridical nature of mobility partnerships may represent 
an attempt to extend Europeanisation by using alternative mechanisms of governance to those 
provided by the EC Treaties. But this objective comes at the expense of increasing the 
vulnerability of the third-country worker – whose security and social protection are those at 
stake – as well as the rule-of-law principles of the EC legal system (democratic control and 
judicial accountability). 
Third, the relationship between mobility partnerships on the one hand and international/EU 
labour and human rights standards on the other is equally contested. The selection of certain 
third countries to benefit from a temporary system of human (labour) mobility opens up a whole 
series of questions in relation to the differential treatment being established for individuals, 
depending on their nationality. Even so, holding the ‘appropriate’ nationality will not be enough 
to fall within the personal scope of the partnerships, as the skills and usefulness of the worker to 
the receiving state will also apply as another distinguishing factor. Only those nationals from the 
non-EU state regarded as part of the privileged category of ‘temporary migrants’, ‘seasonal 
migrants’ or ‘highly skilled’ will be allowed to benefit from the (circular) labour migration 
system. While the context and focus of mobility partnerships are held to be based on the current 
state of the EU’s external relations with a particular third country (and are tailored to the 
specifics of each one), it should be underlined that what is actually being discussed will have 
profound implications for the rights and protection of foreign workers.  
Finally, we argue that mobility partnerships are insecurity policy tools undermining the 
coherency and consistency of a future EU policy on labour immigration. They can be 
considered a new mechanism of external governance challenging the traditional decision-
making and institutional arrangements provided by the Treaties and the foundations of EC law. 
The large degree of differentiation characterising the sort of EU policy coordination covering 
these partnerships endangers the policy coherency of both the internal and external dimensions 
of the EU’s immigration policy. Moreover, this differentiation or variable geometry in their 
arrangements (especially as regards the participation and commitment of EU member states) 
challenges the legitimacy of the partnerships in light of the progressive building of a linkage 
between the common EU immigration policy and its uniformity in external relations policies.  
The paper starts by contextualising the role of mobility partnerships in the wider EU approach 
to migration in section 2. We offer a genealogy of the origins and major transformations 
affecting the concepts of circular migration and mobility partnerships in the EU’s policy 
discourse since the transfer of the immigration domain to shared competence between the EC 
and the member states in 1999. This genealogy aims at providing a foundation for assessing the 
extent to which these new concepts and policy tools truly constitute a transition from a common 
policy centred on the security concerns of the EC and member states towards one allowing for 
regular channels of labour mobility for nationals of third countries. Section 3 examines the 
actual content of the two partnerships already launched between the EU and Moldova and Cape 
Verde, from the perspective of their labour migration provisions and projects, and the way in 4 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
which they envisage the workability of circular migration schemes in practice. Section 4 reflects 
on some of the main deficits of mobility partnerships in three areas: policy coordination, 
differentiation and policy coherency, as well as the rights of migrant workers. Section 5 presents 
a series of conclusions. 
2.  Genealogy of mobility partnerships and circular migration in the EU’s 
labour immigration policy 
This section offers a genealogy of the EU’s official discourse on circular migration and mobility 
partnerships since 1999, when migration was transferred to shared competence between the EC 
and the member states. Our assessment covers the last 10 years of EU integration processes in 
the progressive development of the common EU immigration policy. Our purpose is to identify 
the origins of and main discursive transformations influencing the functionality and concepts of 
circular migration and mobility partnerships across the various policy processes dealing with the 
external dimension of the EU’s labour immigration policy. More specifically, we look at the 
integration of policies dealing with the conditions for the entry, stay and rights of TCNs for 
employment purposes into external relations.
2 The genealogy seeks to trace the underlying logic 
and some of the prevailing interests. It enables us to ascertain the extent to which the official 
rationale of mobility partnerships – i.e. of going beyond security (management of irregular 
immigration and border controls) and allowing legal channels for labour mobility into the EU – 
does indeed constitute the main driving force behind their intended public goal. 
2.1 Circular  migration 
Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999 and the consequent 
insertion of Title IV on “Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement 
of persons” in the EC Treaty, the European Council adopted the first multi-annual programme 
towards building a Union of freedom, security and justice on 15-16 October 1999 – the Tampere 
programme.
3  The latter provided the political guidelines and principles for EU policy over 
domains such as migration for a five-year period (1999–2004). Partnerships with countries of 
origin were identified by the Council as among the so-called ‘Tampere milestones’. In 
particular, the programme called for the adoption of a “comprehensive approach to migration” 
addressing political and human rights alongside development issues in third countries and “a 
greater coherency” between the internal and external policies of the EU.
4  
The Presidency Conclusions adopted at the European Council of Seville on 21-22 June 2002 
took up the baton and paid special attention to the integration of immigration policies into the 
                                                      
2 This paper does not examine policies related to self-employment, training or educational activities. 
3 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 15-16 
October 1999, SN 200/99, Brussels, 1999. 
4 Ibid. The Council expressly agreed in para. 11 that  
[t]he European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human 
rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires 
combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and 
consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of 
minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to 
contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of 
internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also 
be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development. 
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EU’s relations with third countries.
5 The perspective that predominated at the Seville Council 
was shaped by the priority of combating “illegal immigration” and building it into the EU’s 
external relations, through the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries and 
cooperation on improved border controls. The conclusions went as far as stating that “any future 
cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Community concludes 
with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on 
compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration”.
6  As later discussed, this 
securitarian approach to human mobility and borders, promulgated under the auspices of the 
Spanish presidency, has since formed a persistent element in a majority of the subsequent 
discourses, policy responses and political priorities substantiating the progressive development 
of the external dimensions of the EU’s immigration policy.  
The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of November 2002 adopted 
conclusions on “intensified cooperation on the management of migration flows with third 
countries”.
7 In these conclusions, the GAERC confirmed its wish “to intensify EU partnership 
with countries and regions of particular relevance”. It went on to state that the overall objective 
was to strengthen cooperation in the field of irregular migration with special emphasis on the 
conclusion of readmission agreements.The GAERC even identified a group of third countries 
with which the initiation of cooperation was considered essential.
8 It went deeper in the ‘Seville 
approach’ and conceived as a political priority the full integration of “the external dimension of 
the JHA [justice and home affairs] issues in the existing and future relations of the EU with 
third countries”. The GAERC confirmed that all existing and future dialogues with third states 
should cover subjects such as return, readmission and documentation, agreements on the 
management of migration flows, preventive policies and institutional capacity building. 
In December 2002, the European Commission published a Communication bearing the title, 
“Integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with third countries” 
(COM(2002) 703).
9 The Commission’s discourse was one advocating the need to bring the 
migration debate back “to a broader context”, not just covering the security dimension (irregular 
immigration and border controls) promoted by the Seville Presidency Conclusions. Still, it is 
worth quoting a passage of the Communication, which shows what the rationale might have 
actually been for opening up the content of the dialogue with third countries from one solely 
focused on the readmission of irregular immigrants and border controls towards another that 
                                                      
5 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21-22 June 
2002, 13463/02, Brussels, 24 October 2002.  
6 Ibid., para. 33 of the conclusions. In addition, para. 36 stated that  
[i]f full use has been made of existing Community mechanisms but without success, the Council 
may unanimously find that a third country has shown an unjustified lack of cooperation in the 
joint management of migration flows. In that event, the Council may, in accordance with the 
rules laid down in the treaties, adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and other European Union policies, while honouring the Union’s contractual 
commitments but not jeopardising development cooperation objectives. 
7 See General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2463
rd Meeting of the General and External 
Relations Council, 14183/02, Brussels 18 November 2002. The Council stated that “the overall objective 
of the initiatives taken is to offer strengthened cooperation with such countries within the migration field 
in order to further improve the capacity of these countries to fulfil their roles in the international 
endeavours to deal with the many-faceted problems caused by illegal migration”. 
8 In this context, Albania, China, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia, Ukraine 
and Libya were specifically mentioned. 
9 European Commission, Communication on integrating migration issues in the European Union’s 
relations with third countries, COM(2002) 703 final, Brussels, 3 December 2002. 6 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
also includes “legal immigration for employment purposes”. In particular, the Commission 
underlined that when dealing with the issue of readmission agreements,  
[e]xperience so far has taught that the time needed to negotiate a readmission 
agreement, which is seen as being in the sole interest of the Community, should not be 
underestimated and no quick results should be expected. They can only succeed if they 
are part of a broader cooperation agenda, which takes duly into account the problems 
encountered by partner countries to effectively address migration issues. This is the 
reason why the Commission considers that the issue of “leverage” – i.e. providing 
incentives to obtain the co-operation of third countries in the negotiation and 
conclusion of readmission agreements with the European Community – should be 
envisaged on a country-by-country basis, in the context of the global policy, 
cooperation and programming dialogues with the third countries concerned.
10 
(Emphasis added.) 
EC readmission agreements aim at imposing a reciprocal obligation on the contracting parties to 
readmit, upon application and without any further formality, their nationals if they do not or no 
longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the territory of the requesting 
state. This obligation covers non-nationals or stateless persons (or persons of another 
jurisdiction) if it is proven that they hold (or at the time of the entry held) a valid visa or 
residence permit issued by the requested state, or that they entered the EU after having stayed 
on or transited through that state. We remind the reader that since 1999, readmission agreements 
have been a political priority in the view of the Council and certain EU member states for 
dealing with the phenomenon of irregular immigration. Indeed, since then the Council has 
repeatedly urged the Commission to conclude as many as possible and in a timely manner.
11 
By and large, the Commission has encountered a number of difficulties in the negotiations of 
the agreements. One of the obstacles has been based on the inclusion of non-nationals and the 
obligation for the signatory to readmit persons who transited through their territory towards the 
EU, which was a major concern in the course of the negotiations. Yet, according to the officials 
consulted for the elaboration of this paper, practice shows that these initial fears were not 
justified, as readmissions of transit nationals appear to have proceeded smoothly so far.
12 The 
above-mentioned Communication on integrating migration issues (COM(2002) 703) stressed 
that there would be some countries for which the accompanying financial support would not be 
sufficiently attractive for them to sign the agreements and therefore “supplementary types of 
incentives”, such as “increased quotas for migrant workers”, could constitute further 
                                                      
10 Ibid., p. 25. 
11 Since 1999, the Council has given the green light to the European Commission to enter into 
negotiations on multilateral readmission agreements with the following countries: Albania, Algeria, 
China, Hong Kong, Macao, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine. On 21 July 2006, 
this mandate was expanded to include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Only seven readmission agreements have been agreed to date: Hong 
Kong (2003), Macao (2004), Sri Lanka (2005), Albania (2005), Russia (2007), Ukraine (2007) and 
Moldova (2007). See N. Coleman, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee 
Rights, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009; see also F. Trauner and I. Kruse, EC Visa Facilitation 
and Readmission Agreements: Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the Neighbourhood, CEPS 
Working Document No. 290, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008. 
12 See A. Roig and T. Huddleston, “EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-evaluation of the Political 
Impasse”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2007, pp. 363-387. See also M. 
Schieffer, “Community Readmission Agreements with Third Countries – Objectives, Substance and 
Current State of Negotiations”, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2003, pp. 343-
357. THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY | 7 
 
compensatory measures. The Commission recommended a strategy driven by a “partnership on 
migration” based on ‘common interests’ with third countries.
13  
As a follow-up to this Communication, in May 2003 the Council adopted conclusions on 
“migration and development”, which identified the link between these two policies as one of the 
central aspects of the “comprehensive approach towards migration” and stated that 
“establishment of a successful migration policy requires the development of a real partnership 
with third countries”.
14 The conclusions stated that the EU’s action around migration and 
development should be based on a set of principles. These would include the development of an 
“integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to manage migration flows” but address how 
“to tackle the root causes of illegal immigration and to combat smuggling and trafficking in 
human beings” as the most important, long-term objective. Yet again, it invited the Commission 
to step up its efforts to conclude EC readmission agreements,
15 and to present new proposals on  
[w]ays of regulating, in conformity with the needs of the labour market of the Member 
State concerned as assessed by that Member State in accordance with its competencies 
in the labour market sector, demand and supply and organising access of labour, e.g. 
through temporary residence – work permits…[and] [w]ays to facilitate brain and high 
skilled labour circulation, e.g. through promoting outsourcing arrangements from EU 
Member States to developing countries.
16 (Emphasis added.)  
The mandate of the 1999 Tampere Programme expired at the end of 2004. It was then that the 
Council adopted the second multi-annual programme on an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) – The Hague Programme,
17 which provided the policy priorities and agenda for 
the EU’s immigration policy between 2005 and 2009. The programme dedicated one section to 
the external dimension of immigration policy, in which it emphasised once again the need for 
the “timely conclusion of readmission agreements” with third countries, and stated that 
                                                      
13 See European Commission (2002), op. cit., p. 46. Although they fall outside the scope of this paper, the 
introduction of visa facilitation agreements are notable as additional incentives offered by the EU to 
conclude readmission agreements with third countries. The origin of such visa facilitation agreements, 
which foresee the reduction of visa taxes for specific groups such as students or researchers, is found in 
the EU–Russia St. Petersburg Summit in 2003. Russia proposed the conclusion of a visa facilitation 
agreement to balance the burden inherent in the implementation of the readmission agreement. Since 
then, these have also been concluded in the cases of Ukraine and Moldova. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
emphasised the ‘package deal’ linkages between visa facilitation and readmission agreements in their 
study, S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig, “EU Relations with the Wider Europe”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Annual Review, No. 46, 2008, p. 157. 
14 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on migration and development, 8927/03, 
Brussels, 5 May 2003.  
15 Ibid., p. 9. 
16 Ibid., pp. 8-9. In this last ‘integration-related’ element, the Council stated that emphasis should be put 
on measures likely to afford them rights and obligations comparable to those of citizens of the 
European Union and aimed at enhancing language skills, knowledge of the legal and social 
system in the Member States concerned as well as on policies which should also promote non-
discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and develop measures against racism and 
xenophobia; education and training of legal migrants living and working in the EU, including 
their vocational integration. Special attention must be paid in this context to socially vulnerable 
groups. 
17 See Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and 
Justice in the European Union, OJ C 53/1, 3.3.2005(a). See also T. Balzacq and S. Carrera “The Hague 
Programme: The Long Road to Freedom, Security and Justice”, in T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds), Security 
versus Freedom: A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2006, pp. 1-34. 8 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
EU policy should aim at assisting third countries, in full partnership, using existing 
Community funds where appropriate, in their efforts to improve their capacity for 
migration management and refugee protection, prevent and combat illegal immigration, 
inform on legal channels for migration, resolve refugee situations by providing better 
access to durable solutions, build border-control capacity, enhance document security 
and tackle the problem of return [sic].
18  
The Commission provided “some concrete orientations” as to the ways in which the link 
between migration and development policies could be implemented in practice in the 
Communication on migration and development (COM(2005) 390) of September 2005.
19 The 
Communication dealt with material topics and put forward “possible actions that could be 
carried out at the EU level, in partnership with developing countries of origin” to ensure that 
“the integration of migration aspects should respect the overall coherence of EU external 
policies and actions”. Among the features highlighted by the Commission were the concepts of 
“circular migration” and “brain circulation”: 
Migrants’ return, even temporary or virtual, can play a useful role in fostering the 
transfer of skills to the developing world, together with other forms of brain 
circulation. Facilitating circular migration could also play a key role in this respect... 
Policies to maximise the developmental impact of temporary migration, in addition to 
the general recommendations on remittances, should focus on encouraging circular 
migration, by giving a priority for further temporary employment to workers who have 
already worked under such schemes and have returned at the end of their contract, and 
also on offering appropriate rewards to participating migrants.
20 (Emphasis added.) 
This statement was the first occasion on which circular migration officially appeared in the 
European Commission’s discourse. In it, we can already see that the paradigm of circularity was 
very much rooted in and dependent upon the principles that migration is temporal and entails 
the return of third-country workers. Annex 5 of the Communication provided a working 
definition of circular migration as a form of mobility in which “migrants tend to go back and 
forth between the source country and the destination country”. This recurrent movement of 
labour would mainly depend on the needs, shortages and demands of EU member states. The 
Commission proposed “to maximize the potential of temporary migration” by encouraging a 
kind of circular migration that gives “priority for further temporary employment to workers who 
have already worked under such schemes and have returned at the end of their contract, and also 
on offering appropriate rewards to participating migrants”.
21 Annex 5 also stressed that the 
Commission would study the possibility to present a new legislative proposal “defining a 
general framework for the entrance and short-term stay within the common area of seasonal 
migrants”.
22 Furthermore, the Communication proposed, among others, the following two 
elements: first, reinforcing coordination among member states and the exchange of state (and 
                                                      
18 See section 1.6 of the programme (Council of the European Union, 2005a). 
19 European Commission, Communication migration and development: Some concrete orientations, 
COM(2005) 390, Brussels, 1 September 2005(a). For a critical account on the migration–development 
nexus refer to P. Raghuram, “Which Migration? What Development? Unsettling the Edifice of Migration 
and Development”, Population, Space and Place, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2009, pp. 103-117.  
20 European Commission (2005a) op. cit. 
21 Ibid., p. 26. 
22 Ibid. Annex 5 of the Communication also mentioned “temporary or virtual return” and “[d]iaspora 
skills databases”, along with the issue of virtual return relying on electronic communications. THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY | 9 
 
EU) policy practices/experience;
23 and, second, enhancing “the dialogue based on partnership 
with interested developing third countries and their regional organizations”.  
It is important to highlight that the Communication on migration and development (COM(2005) 
390) made express reference to the Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic 
migration (COM(2004) 811),
24 which the Commission published in November 2005. The Green 
Paper sought to foster a public debate among EU institutions, member states and civil society 
about the ‘added value’ and the most appropriate approach to guide EU rules for admitting 
TCNs for employment-related purposes after the withdrawal of the 2001 Commission proposal 
for a directive on the employment of TCNs in the EU.
25 The Commission identified cooperation 
with third countries as an important accompanying dimension to the EU’s approach on 
economic migration and elaborated that possible policy measures could be  
to provide up-to-date information on the conditions of entry and residence in the EU; to 
establish recruitment and training centres in the countries of origin for skills which are 
needed at EU level, and for cultural and language training; to create databases per 
skill/occupation/sector (portfolio of competences) of potential migrants; to facilitate the 
transfer of remittances; to compensate third countries for the educational costs of 
migrants leaving for the EU. Another issue is whether certain third countries could be 
granted a preference for the admission of their nationals in the framework of 
reinforced cooperation agreements.
26 (Emphasis added.) 
At their informal meeting at Hampton Court on 27 October 2005, European heads of state and 
government again stressed the importance of developing a “‘comprehensive approach’ to tackle 
immigration issues” and demanded that the European Commission present “a list of priority 
actions for improving global migration, with a special focus on the African region”.
27 In 
November 2005, the Commission adopted a Communication entitled “Priority actions for 
responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court” (COM(2005) 
621).
28 The Communication did not stress regular and labour migration aspects, and instead 
gave overwhelming priority to the management of migration with a particular regional emphasis 
on the Mediterranean area and Africa. The Commission highlighted that “the EU will develop 
approaches on migration to optimise the benefits of migration for all partners in a spirit of 
partnership”. These approaches are to include the following elements: “fostering the linkages 
                                                      
23 Ibid. Annex 7 of the Communication stated that  
[t]he Commission is in favour of initiating a multidisciplinary dialogue with and between 
Member States on migration and development, in which Member States’ Ministries dealing with 
migration in its various aspects – Development, Employment, External Relations, and Justice 
and Home Affairs – would be represented. This dialogue would aim at reinforcing coherence 
between the two policy areas…in doing so, contributing to improve overall coherence of these 
activities, in particular to maximise EU leverage at the global level (p. 35). 
24 European Commission, Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration, COM(2004) 
811 final, Brussels, 1 November 2005(b). 
25 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence 
for the purpose of paid employment and self-employment activities, COM(2001) 0386 final, Brussels, 11 
July 2001. See also S. Carrera and M. Formisano, An EU Approach to Labour Migration: What is the Added 
Value and the Way Ahead?, CEPS Working Document No. 232, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, 2005. 
26 European Commission (2005b), op. cit., p. 11. 
27 See the press release by the UK Prime Minister’s office at 10 Downing Street, “Press conference at EU 
informal summit Hampton Court” (retrieved from http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8393.asp). 
28 European Commission, Communication on priority actions for responding to the challenges of 
migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court, COM(2005) 621 final, Brussels, 30 November 2005(c). 10 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
between migration and development, e.g. by promoting safer, easier and cheaper remittance 
transfers; facilitat[ing] the role of diasporas as agents for development; [and] explor[ing] options 
for temporary or circular migration; mitigat[ing] the impact of skill losses in vulnerable 
sectors”.
29 (Emphasis added.) 
The Communication identified as a specific policy priority the inclusion of migration issues in 
the political talks with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, paying particular 
attention to issues such as remittances, capacity building in the management of migration flows 
and improving integration in destination countries. As regards this last item, it was stated that a 
priority would be dialogue with key countries of origin, for which 
the Commission will provide an overview of the possibilities and procedures for legal 
migration to the Member States, and will evaluate possible methods to raise awareness 
thereof in countries of origin. The EU and the respective countries of origin should 
identify and support projects through which the legal movement of students, 
researchers and workers, on a permanent or temporary basis, can be favoured.
30 
(Emphasis added.) 
The follow-up to the above-mentioned Green Paper (COM(2004) 811) materialised in the 
adoption of a policy plan on legal migration, which listed the actions and legislative initiatives 
the Commission envisaged presenting before the end of 2009 in the area of labour 
immigration.
31 The policy plan foresaw that in 2007 the Commission would submit a proposal 
for a directive aimed at establishing a common general framework of rights for all immigrants 
who are in legal employment and who have already been admitted to the EU territory.
32 In 
addition, the plan advocated a sectoral or selective approach to labour immigration, instead of 
covering without distinction all the categories of immigrant workers with a horizontal measure. 
This approach is taking shape in the specific legislative proposals dealing respectively with the 
conditions for the admission and residence of the following categories of third-country workers: 
highly qualified workers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees and remunerated 
trainees.
33 The policy plan included a section dealing with “Cooperation with Countries of 
Origin”, in which the Commission took on board the priority for the EU to 
actively pursue efforts to design temporary migration schemes that could help 
maximise benefits for all interested parties, i.e. responding to labour needs in Member 
States while contributing, through eventual return, to the development of countries of 
origin and offering skills and other gains to participating migrants.
34 (Emphasis added.) 
                                                      
29 Ibid., p. 6.  
30 Ibid.  
31 European Commission, Communication on a policy plan on legal migration, COM(2005) 669, 
Brussels, 21 December 2005(d). 
32 This materialised in the European Commission’s Proposal for Directive on a single application 
procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a member 
state and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a member state, 
COM(2007) 638 final, Brussels, 23 October 2007(a), which has not been yet adopted by the Council. 
33 The two first proposals for a directive were presented on 23 October 2007, dealing respectively with 
the conditions of entry and residence of highly qualified employment, as well as a single application 
procedure and a common set of rights for third-country workers. The Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment was adopted on 25 May 2009. (See Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment, OJ L 155/17, 18.6.2009.) 
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The Council Presidency Conclusions of December 2005 formally adopted the EU’s official 
discourse, which had been articulated since 1999 by both the Council and the Commission, on 
the need to ensure a global stance in the EU’s immigration policy.
35 Subsequently, the 
conclusions have been identified as the point at which the Council officially adopted the global 
approach to migration. The conclusions viewed the “global approach” as consisting of a set of 
priority actions intending “to reduce illegal migration flows and the loss of lives, ensure safe 
return of illegal migrants, strengthen durable solutions for refugees, and build capacity to better 
manage migration, including through maximising the benefits to all partners of legal migration, 
while fully respecting human rights and the individual’s right to seek asylum”.
36 It is important 
to underline that beyond this political statement, the priority actions identified by the Council in 
the conclusions did not include an express reference to regular or labour immigration measures.  
2.2 Mobility  partnerships 
The idea of partnerships and agreements with third countries covering (among others) 
migration-related policies that offer legal channels for labour mobility has been around in the 
Commission’s discourse for some time. Still, it was not until the end of 2006 that the idea of EU 
partnerships offering circular immigration schemes to third countries became an attractive 
policy tool for Nicolas Sarkozy and Wolfgang Schäuble (then the ministers of interior of France 
and Germany, respectively) as a strategy to reduce irregular immigration flows into the EU.
37 
The actual origins of mobility partnerships as another managerial tool at the service of the EU’s 
immigration policy can be found in the Franco–German initiative for a “New European 
Migration Policy” of 26 October 2006:  
We do not want uncontrolled immigration into our labour markets and our social 
security systems. In order to promote circular migration, quotas should be set for the 
migration of labour into certain occupations…in order for the concept of circular 
migration to succeed, it is important that migrants return to their countries of origin 
after their stay in an EU member state. …Finally, we also have to make sure that the 
countries of origin unconditionally comply with their obligation to readmit those 
migrants who do not want to return voluntarily.
38 (Emphasis added.)  
                                                      
35 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 15 and 16 
December 2005, SN 15914/01/05, 30 December 2005(b). See specifically Annex 1 of the conclusions, 
“Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean”. Para. 8 of 
the conclusions states that the Council  
underlines the need for a balanced, global and coherent approach, covering policies to combat 
illegal immigration and, in cooperation with third countries, harnessing the benefits of legal 
migration. It recalls that migration issues are a central element in the EU's relations with a broad 
range of third countries, including, in particular, the regions neighbouring the Union, namely the 
eastern, south eastern and Mediterranean regions, and notes the importance of ensuring that the 
appropriate level of financial resources is allocated to these policies. The EU will strengthen its 
dialogue and cooperation with all those countries on migration issues, including return 
management, in a spirit of partnership and having regard to the circumstances of each country 
concerned. 
36 Refer to Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency on a Global Approach to Migration: 
Priority Actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean, 15744/05, Brussels, 13 December 2005(c). 
37 S. Angenendt, “Circular Migration: A Sustainable Concept for Migration Policy?”, Comments, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin. 
38 “New European Migration Policy”, a Franco-German plan presented by Nicolas Sarkozy and Wolfgang 
Schäuble to G6 immigration ministers meeting in the UK, 26 October 2006, p. 4. 12 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
The most important political priority of the bilateral initiative was clearly the need to control 
and contain what they deemed “the migratory pressure” from southern Europe. It also called for 
more support for the European Commission in the negotiations of readmission agreements with 
third countries, through quotas and permits for temporary workers. The initiative reaffirmed the 
need for stronger cooperation with the countries of origin and referred to the possibility for 
member states to coordinate “bilateral partnerships…on the basis of a uniform European treaty” 
with a certain country of origin. It argued that “the sum of all such partnerships would result in a 
European partnership with a large number of countries of origin”.
39 It therefore called on the 
Commission to conclude “such partnership agreements between EU Member States and 
migrants’ main countries of origin, and to present the Council with a plan for development 
partnerships”.  
It was also during 2006 that migration became an important component of the EU’s strategy for 
Africa and the political dialogue between the two regions.
40 This first materialised in a Joint 
Africa–EU Declaration on Migration and Development, adopted in Tripoli, 22-23 November 
2006.
41 The Declaration emphasised that “selective migration approaches in developed countries 
could constitute an additional threat to African social and economic development” and that it 
was necessary to develop “mechanisms and channels that facilitate circular migration as well as 
recruitment policies that take into account the specific needs of countries of origin and 
destination”. It is worth remembering that the Joint Declaration reiterated the recommendation 
put forward by the 23
rd Assembly of Heads of State and Government of Africa and France in 
Bamako of 3-4 December 2005, which had invited EU member states to conclude agreements or 
conventions on border management, residence conditions and the granting of work permits.
42 
Amid these policy processes, and as a response to the call of the 2005 Council conclusions to 
report on progress in implementing the first phase of the global approach to migration (with a 
focus on “Africa and the Mediterranean”), on 30 November 2006 the Commission published a 
Communication on the situation “one year on” (COM(2006) 735).
 43 The Communication aimed 
at presenting ways “to make the EU’s approach truly comprehensive” and suggested other areas 
not originally covered by the 2005 global approach adopted by the Council, but which in its 
view should include “measures on legal immigration and integration”.
44 Two concrete initiatives 
were emphasised: migration centres and “mobility packages”. In relation to migration centres, 
the Communication called for the EU to financially support the setting-up of centres providing 
information about the legal possibilities for working in the EU in partner countries, which 
materialised for instance in the establishment of the Migration Management and Information 
                                                      
39 Ibid., p. 5.  
40 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 15-16 
December 2005, 15914/05, Brussels, 30 January 2006. 
41 See the Joint Africa–EU Declaration on Migration and Development, Tripoli, 22-23 November 2006. 
42 See the document on the website of the French embassy, Conférence des chefs d’état et de 
gouvernement d’Afrique et de France – Communiqué final, 4 December 2005 (retrieved from 
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Conference-des-chefs-d-etat-et-de.html). 
43 See European Commission, Communication on a global approach to migration one year on: Towards a 
comprehensive European migration policy, COM(2006) 735, Brussels, 3 November 2006.  
44 Ibid. The Communication stated, “[i]n this way, partnership with third countries will address the full 
range of issues of interest and concern to all involved” (p. 2). The Commission proposed that the 
‘comprehensive approach’ should be built around three main principles: first, solidarity among the EU 
member states; second, partnerships with third countries; and third, protection of TCNs (p. 4). THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY | 13 
 
Centre in Mali in October 2008.
45 Concerning circular migration, the Commission 
recommended reinforcing the ‘labour management capacity’ of the countries of origin,
46 stating,  
Once certain conditions have been met, such as cooperation on illegal immigration and 
effective mechanisms for readmission, the objective could be to agree Mobility 
Packages with a number of interested third countries, which would enable their citizens 
to have better access to the EU. Mobility packages would provide the overall 
framework for managing such movements and would bring together the possibilities 
offered by the Member States and the European Community, while fully respecting the 
division of competences as provided by the Treaty.
47 (Emphasis added.) 
The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 14-15 December 2006,
48 
under the Finnish presidency, continued with the traditional EU discourse that had been 
developed until then and according to which a ‘comprehensive’ EU migration policy required a 
‘genuine partnership’ with third countries and should be fully integrated into the EU’s external 
policies. In particular, the conclusions advocated a strengthening of international cooperation 
and dialogue with third countries. For the first time since 1999, the Council requested that the 
Commission present detailed proposals on how to better organise and provide information on 
the various forms of legal movement between the EU and third countries. In May 2007, the 
Commission presented a Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships 
between the EU and third countries (COM(2007) 248).
49 The Communication identified circular 
migration and mobility partnerships as two key elements or “novel approaches to improve the 
management of legal movements of people between the EU and third countries”. The body of 
the Communication was divided into two main sections (one on mobility partnerships and the 
other on circular migration) and it contained an annex with details about projects, some of 
which covered circular migration initiatives. 
It was the first time that the Commission used the term ‘mobility partnerships’ instead of 
‘mobility packages’. The Communication tackled two important issues in relation to the 
partnerships: their legal nature and content. It highlighted that they would present an inherently 
complex legal nature. It was proposed that the negotiation of the partnerships would be based on 
political guidelines provided by the Council and following a recommendation from the 
European Commission, and that they should also provide a “follow-up mechanism”. The 
content would depend on the current state of the EU’s external relations with the particular third 
country (and would be tailored to the specifics of that country), as well as the level of 
commitment that the third country would be ready to make “in terms of action against illegal 
immigration and facilitating the reintegration of refugees”.
50 The content was then structured 
around commitments from the third country on the one hand, and the EC and the participating 
                                                      
45 Ibid. The Communication stated that “[s]uch centres could also play a role in facilitating the 
management of seasonal workers, the exchanges of students and researchers and other forms of legal 
movement of people”. 
46 Ibid. In addition to “capacity building of the national employment services responsible for labour 
migration management, capacity building of the national employment services in third countries and the 
development of intermediation establishments as well as the implementation of pre-immigration plans in 
countries of origin” (p. 7). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 14-15 
December 2006, 16879/1/06, Brussels, 12 February 2007(a). 
49 European Commission, Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the 
European Union and third countries, COM(2007) 248 final, Brussels, 15 May 2007(b).  
50 Ibid., p. 3. 14 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
member states on the other. The Commission stressed that the EC would expect from third 
countries a commitment on “fighting illegal immigration…where appropriate in the framework 
of an EC readmission agreement”. The latter would include the readmission of their own 
nationals, TCNs and stateless persons who entered the EU through their territory – readmission 
agreements. They would also include a range of security initiatives destined to discourage 
irregular immigration (through information campaigns), improve border controls and the 
security of travel documents, cooperation in the exchange of information among law 
enforcement authorities and measures on the smuggling and trafficking of human beings. The 
conditions for being offered the possibility to conclude a mobility partnership would therefore 
be close degree of cooperation in the field of security from the perspective of the EU and its 
member states, in which the EU readmission policy would play a fundamental role.
51 
Among the commitments on the part of the EC and member states that the Communication 
highlighted was one related to mechanisms offering improved opportunities for regular 
migration for nationals of the third country, based on the labour needs of interested member 
states. In the view of the Commission, this preferential treatment could take two forms. The first 
would be a consolidated offer by several member states, which would then constitute an ‘EC 
offer’ to the partner country in question. National offers could consist of labour quotas or 
instruments facilitating labour matching. The second would be more favourable treatment in 
terms of the admission of certain categories of TCNs. 
The second section of the Communication was dedicated to circular migration as “an alternative 
to illegal immigration”.
52 The Commission points out that “[i]f not properly designed and 
managed, migration intended to be circular can easily become permanent and, thus, defeat its 
objective”. The Commission confirmed the definition of circular migration that it had already 
offered in its previous Communication on migration and development (COM(2005) 390), and 
clarified that the kind of circular migration of TCNs that the EU would be wishing to facilitate 
would be one foreseeing the opportunity  
to come to the EU temporarily for work, study, training or a combination of these on 
the condition that, at the end of the period for which they were granted entry, they must 
re-establish their main residence and their main activity in their country of origin. 
Circularity can be enhanced by giving migrants the possibility, once they have 
returned, to retain some form of privileged mobility [to] and from the Member States 
where they were formerly residing, for example in the form of simplified admission/re-
entry procedures.
53 (Emphasis added.) 
Along with giving incentives to promote circularity, the Communication argued that, to make 
certain that it is effective, TCNs would be required to return to their country of origin after their 
permits (or legality of stay according to national immigration law) expired. The Commission 
even went as far as proposing that one possible measure could be  
the requirement for a written commitment by migrants to return voluntarily to their 
countries of origin once their contract expires. In case that migrants stay illegally on 
EU territory instead of returning voluntarily after the expiration of their permit, 
readmission by the country of origin should take place. This would be easier to achieve 
                                                      
51 Ibid. Another commitment that deserves to be underlined is that “to promote productive employment 
and decent work, and more generally to improve the economic and social framework conditions, [which] 
should also be sought from the third country concerned as they may contribute to reducing the incentives 
for irregular migration” (p. 4). 
52 Ibid., p. 8. 
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where there are readmission arrangements in force between the EC or the Member 
State in question and the country of origin.
54 (Emphasis added.) 
Once again, it is apparent how the principle of expulsion through readmission constituted one of 
the main worries of the Commission in its desire to guarantee the success of the expected 
circularity and temporal nature of human mobility for labour-related purposes. In this way, 
circularity has become an opposing concept to that of permanent settlement. Its workability 
depends fully on the lack of security of residence and social integration of third-country workers 
in the receiving state. The continuing relevance of the securitarian approach towards migration 
and borders (made clear in Seville in 2002) is evident when the Commission refers to the utility 
of circular migration for ensuring return in the event that the third-country worker does not 
comply with the imposed ‘circularity’ and instead wishes to continue residing in the receiving 
country under an irregular administrative status.  
The GAERC meeting of 17-18 June 2007
55 adopted conclusions on migration in which it 
welcomed the Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships (COM(2007) 
248), and confirmed that these concepts and tools could contribute towards the EU’s 
“comprehensive approach to migration”. It reiterated that “active consideration must be given to 
how legal migration opportunities can be incorporated into the Union’s external policies in 
order to develop a balanced partnership with interested third countries”. Yet, the conclusions 
show certain precautions in contrast with the previous Council policy responses and discourse. 
The Council, which took place under the auspices of the German presidency, was of the opinion 
that mobility partnerships would only be used when they brought added value to both the EU 
and the third country. When listing the measures and policies that make up the content of the 
partnerships, the Council did not include regular migration as a component.
56 It was only in the 
final paragraph of the conclusions that it said,  
[t]he Council agrees that legal migration opportunities, including well-managed 
circular migration can potentially benefit all partners involved. All possibilities for a 
well-managed circular migration should therefore be explored in close cooperation 
with all relevant stakeholders.
57 (Emphasis added.) 
The European Council’s Presidency Conclusions of 21-22 June 2007 underlined yet again the 
importance of international cooperation in the management of migration flows.
58 In contrast to 
the previous Council conclusions, they went a bit further: 
                                                      
54 Ibid., p. 12. 
55 General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2808
th Meeting of the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council, 17-18 June 2007, Luxembourg, 10654/07 (Press 137), June 2007(a). 
56 Ibid. Among the very broad range of items for potentially coverage by the mobility partnerships, the 
Council mentioned the following: 
the enhancement of the links between migration and development, i.e. to facilitate productive 
use of the resources of migrant communities and to promote co-development projects; the 
pooling of support measures in capacity building in order to better manage and control 
migration; the promotion of the reintegration of returnees; visa facilitation in accordance with 
the common approach, taking into account the experiences in the implementation of the current 
agreements; the enhancement of the protection of human rights in the fight against illegal 
immigration, in readmission and return policies and in the reception of migrants and asylum 
seekers; and the protection of refugees in accordance with international standards (para. 10).  
57 Ibid., para. 12. 
58 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 21-22 June 
2007, 11177/1/07, Brussels, 10 July 2007(b). 16 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
Specific partnerships on migration with third countries could contribute to a coherent 
migration policy which combines measures aimed at facilitating well-managed legal 
migration opportunities and their benefits – while respecting Member States' 
competences and the specific needs of their labour markets – with those fighting illegal 
migration, protecting refugees and tackling the root causes of migration while at the 
same time impacting positively on development in countries of origin. The possibility 
of mobility partnerships should be further explored as well as possibilities for circular 
migration. (Emphasis added.) 
It was in the GAERC conclusions on mobility partnerships and circular migration in the 
framework of the global approach to migration of 10 December 2007 that the mobility 
partnerships were affirmed as “a novel approach capable of bringing added value” to the EU’s 
immigration policy.
59 For the first time, the Council invited the Commission (in cooperation 
with EU member states and the presidency) to open dialogue with Cape Verde and Moldova, 
with a view to launching pilot mobility partnerships. The conclusions stated that exploratory 
discussions would also be taken forward with other interested third countries.
60 The 
Commission was asked to report on progress in this regard no later than June 2008. In a 
departure from the previous conclusions, here the Council included “an adequate framework to 
promote circular migration” and “partnerships between labour market agencies of partner 
countries and member states to better match supply and demand” among the possible 
ingredients of mobility partnerships.
61 Furthermore, the Council invited the Commission and the 
member states to ensure that Community law on legal migration would not impede circular 
migration.  
During the second half of 2008, the French presidency identified migration as one of its political 
priorities. It proposed a “European pact on migration and asylum”, which was finally adopted 
by the European Council on 15-16 October 2008. The pact identified as a guiding principle of 
the future EU migration policy the creation of “a comprehensive partnership with the countries 
of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between migration and 
development”.
62 It called for speeding up the deployment of tools pertaining to the EU’s global 
                                                      
59 See General Affairs and External Relations Council, 2839
th Meeting of the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council, 10 December, Brussels, “Global approach to migration – Circular migration – 
Council conclusions”, 16326/07 (Press 288), Brussels, December 2007(b). The conclusions stated that 
“the contents of individual mobility partnerships may vary considerably from one country to another, 
reflecting the specific characteristics of each situation and the respective objectives, priorities and security 
concerns of both the EU, its Member States and individual third countries”. 
60 Ibid., para. 12. The conclusions said that  
[e]xploratory discussions will be taken forward with a number of other interested third countries 
with a view to the possibility of launching additional pilot mobility partnerships… In this 
respect, special consideration will be given to those third countries that have indicated their 
willingness to open such dialogue and are willing to work with the EU and its Member States on 
effective migration management…the development of future mobility partnerships should take 
account of the experience gained from the pilot projects. Based on these further exploratory 
discussions, the Council may request that dialogue be opened with a view to launching pilot 
mobility partnerships. 
61 Ibid., para. 16.  
62 See Justice and Home Affairs Council, 2887
th Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 24-25 
July 2008, Brussels, 11653/08, Presse (205), July 2008; see also Council of the European Union, 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 13440/08, Brussels, 24 September 2008(a); and also S. 
Carrera and E. Guild, The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum: 
Intergovernmentalism vs. Europeanism? Security vs. Rights?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 170, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, September 2008. THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY | 17 
 
approach to migration, such as mobility partnerships and circular migration programmes “to 
ensure a balance between the migration routes from the South and those from the East and 
South-east and take account of the lessons learned in these matters when negotiating EU and 
bilateral agreements on migration and readmission with countries of origin and of transit”. On 
the same occasion, the European Commission published a Communication entitled “A common 
immigration policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools” (COM(2008) 359) in June 2008.
63 
In this document, the Commission presented a set of 10 common principles that in its view 
should also guide the future development of a common immigration policy, which it grouped 
under three general headings: prosperity, security and solidarity. Partnerships with third 
countries were included under the heading of solidarity, for which mobility partnerships and 
circular migration were identified as their most important constituents.
64  
Under the Czech presidency, a ministerial conference on “Building Migration Partnerships” was 
held in Prague on 27-28 April 2009, which was to link, according to the officials consulted, 
migration with security issues in the eastern and south-eastern dimensions of the EU’s global 
approach.
65 The output of the Conference was the adoption of a Joint Declaration by the 
participating states, which included the following ones: i) all EU member states as well as 
Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Turkey; ii) Moldova, Albania, Croatia, Kosovo and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; iii) other countries such as the Russian Federation, Armenia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and 
Montenegro; and iv) the European Commission (DG JFS).
66 According to the Joint Declaration, 
[migration] partnerships will take different forms according to migration challenges, 
migratory routes and priorities of the partners. They will address the following 
objectives: to prevent and fight illegal migration, to promote readmission, voluntary 
return and sustainable reintegration, to address legal migration with a special emphasis 
on labour migration, to further promote the integration of legally residing migrants in 
their host societies, and to make migration and mobility positive forces for 
development. (Emphasis added.) 
To our knowledge no more concrete developments around these ‘migration partnerships’ have 
taken place so far.
67 It is not clear what actual differences these kinds of partnerships would 
contain in contrast with mobility partnerships. In any case, looking at the ways in which the 
Joint Declaration frames and justifies the implementation of migration partnerships, the 
arguments put forward in section 3 of this paper in relation to mobility partnerships are most 
                                                      
63 European Commission, Communication on a common immigration policy for Europe: Principles, 
actions and tools, COM(2008) 359, Brussels, 17 June 2008. 
64 Ibid. In particular, the Communication stated the EU and member states need to  
[a]gree, together with interested Member States, mobility partnerships with partner countries, 
paving the way for management arrangements for labour immigration with long-term strategic 
partners as well as cooperation on return issues; and provide real possibilities for circular 
migration, by setting up or strengthening legal and operational measures granting legal 
immigrants the right to priority access to further legal residence in the EU (p. 10). 
65 European Commission, Communication on applying the global approach to migration to the eastern 
and south-eastern regions neighbouring the European Union, COM(2007) 247 final, Brussels, 16 May 
2007(c). 
66 Council of the European Union, Ministerial Conference “Building Migration Partnerships” in Prague, 
27-28 April 2009, 9283/09, Brussels, 29 April 2009(a). 
67 The final para. of the Joint Declaration states the following: “With regard to this and to the follow up, 
we mandate our senior officials to further elaborate the agreed principles and elements for our migration 
partnerships, including an impact assessment for those elements which have already been implemented, 
and we propose to organize a second Ministerial Conference in due time” (p. 12). 18 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
pertinent.
68 Moreover, also under the auspices of the Czech presidency, in May 2009 the Eastern 
Partnership
69 was launched, which vaguely envisages – on a voluntary basis – platforms for 
multilateral cooperation between the EU and its Eastern European neighbours.
70 
The Swedish presidency will adopt the successor to The Hague Programme before the end of 
2009. The third multi-annual programme on an AFSJ – the Stockholm Programme – will 
present the general principles and policy priorities guiding EU policy for the next five years. 
The European Commission published its contribution to the Stockholm Programme on 10 June 
2009 in the Communication entitled “An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice serving the 
citizen (COM(2009) 262).
71 Among the ‘successes’ that the Commission identified in relation to 
the progress achieved during the last 10 years of the EU’s AFSJ were “partnerships with non-
Union countries”.
72 The Communication highlighted that dialogue and partnership on migration 
issues with third countries are important factors for the consolidation of the ‘global and 
comprehensive approach’. It called for the strengthening of “partnerships for mobility” and the 
conclusion of new agreements “covering the three dimensions of the comprehensive approach: 
controlling illegal migration (including readmission and support for voluntary return and 
reintegration), promotion of mobility and legal immigration, and support for development on the 
lines of the partnerships for mobility”.
73 
2.3 From  security  towards mobility? 
The way mobility partnerships and circular migration have been promoted at the EU level has 
been through a discourse arguing that they offer innovative strategies for making the EU 
approach to migration ‘more global, balanced and comprehensive’. This is accomplished 
through the inclusion of not only security measures but also other policy initiatives facilitating 
legal channels for the mobility of TCNs for employment purposes. The EU’s official discourses 
have argued that mobility partnerships exemplify a transition from a policy approach 
exclusively worrying about security towards one intending to favour labour mobility into the 
                                                      
68 Perhaps one important difference with mobility partnerships is para. (c) of the Joint Declaration, which 
calls for these migration partnerships to promote the protection of refugees. Yet as discussed in section 3 
of this paper, this aspect is completely lacking from the scope of the partnerships concluded with 
Moldova and Cape Verde, and “the integration of legally residing migrants”. The precise wording 
provided by the Joint Declaration on Migration Partnerships is as follows: 
These partnerships should contribute to fulfilling the obligations towards refugees resulting from 
international documents by which countries are bound, such as the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 1951 as amended by the Protocol of 1967, in particular with full respect 
for the principle of non-refoulement, and of the obligations towards other persons in need of 
international protection resulting inter alia from the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and promote protection, assistance and durable 
solutions for these persons (p. 6). 
69 See Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 
8435/09, 7 June 2009(b).  
70 For an analysis of the process leading to Eastern Partnerships and its shortcomings, refer to H. Wallace, 
The European Union and its Neighbourhood: Time for Rethink, ELIAMEP Thesis 4/2009, Hellenic 
Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Athens, May 2009. 
71 See European Commission, Communication on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice serving the 
citizen, COM(2009) 262, Brussels, 10 June 2009(a). S. Carrera and E. Guild, Towards the Next Phase of 
the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Commission’s Proposals for the 
Stockholm Programme, CEPS Policy Brief No. 196, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
August 2009.  
72 European Commission (2009), op. cit., p. 3. 
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EU. This line of rhetoric has most probably been the reason these agreements or joint 
declarations have been officially labelled as ‘mobility’ partnerships and not ‘security’ 
partnerships. By qualifying them in the context of mobility, the EU strategy has presented them 
in a more attractive fashion to third states, which perhaps would not be so keen to cooperate if 
the partnerships were presented as dealing with more of the same: i.e. the security of the EU and 
its member states (readmission, return and border controls). 
That notwithstanding, the transition from security to mobility is difficult to sustain based on the 
analysis conducted in this paper. The relationship between the partnerships and mobility is a 
misleading one and obscures their actual rationales and intended public goals. Indeed, the main 
policy processes and arguments sustained by the Council, some member states and the 
Commission on the connection between the EU’s labour immigration policy and external 
relations illustrates that mobility partnerships have not brought about any profound shift from 
security to mobility in EU policy. These partnerships clearly reflect how the EU and its member 
states conceive and construct their own security from the perspective of irregular immigration 
and border controls, as well as labour market security and financial needs. Therefore, mobility 
partnerships rather constitute security partnerships because they address the security concerns of 
the EU and the member states, which also cover labour immigration policies from a utilitarian, 
selective and temporal perspective. 
The external dimension of the EU’s immigration policy has been mainly developed since 1999 
following the security agenda set by the Council and some EU member states, and subsequently 
transferred to the EU discourse by the DG JFS. It is true that the securitarian approach adopted 
at the 2002 Seville Council has been subject to various transformations in later EU policy 
responses dealing with the integration of migration policy in the political dialogue and 
cooperation with third countries. The EU’s global approach to migration now presents legal or 
labour immigration policies as one of its components. Yet it would difficult to argue that these 
changing dynamics have actually implied that security no longer functions as the fundamental 
factor driving the EU’s agenda in the external dimension of its labour immigration policy. 
Security has not just been a core element in the origins of the linkage between mobility 
partnerships and the concept of circular migration – it now represents one of their features. This 
is evidenced by the accent put on management of irregular immigration and borders as the most 
important condition for the EU to agree to cooperate on labour immigration with any interested 
third country and by the ‘circular’ nature of the labour immigration policy that mobility 
partnerships appear to promote. 
We argued in section 2.1 above that the inclusion in the EU’s discourse of the need to offer 
legal channels for labour mobility in international agreements finds its roots in the difficulties 
experienced by the DG JFS in promoting the conclusion of readmission agreements. Broadening 
the scope of migration issues in the EU’s external relations to cover labour policies was 
considered a necessary incentive and compensatory measure for convincing third countries to 
negotiate readmission agreements and digest the EU approach to curbing irregular immigration. 
The diplomatic barriers experienced by the Commission when trying to make third countries’ 
authorities sign readmission agreements led to a realisation at the EU level of the need for new 
policy strategies beyond financial issues/aid. Third states were particularly interested in the 
provision of regular channels of immigration, including those for employment. This is precisely 
what mobility partnerships and circular migration schemes were intended to grant. 
The security-driven agenda underlying mobility partnerships equally emerges when assessing 
the evolution of this policy tool in the 2006 Franco–German initiative discussed above. This 
was the first occasion on which the ministries of interior of two leading EU member states 
advocated the development of EU partnerships with third states in conjunction with circular 
migration schemes. The Franco–German initiative conceived mobility partnerships as a possible 20 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
response or alternative to the phenomenon of irregular immigration and a solution to the 
migratory pressure (especially from Africa) experienced by southern and south-western Europe. 
The French and German representatives maintained that the quotas and temporary permits for 
third-country workers provided by the partnerships would be an effective way to support the 
European Commission in the negotiations of readmission agreements with targeted third 
countries. This understanding on the part of the ministries of interior – according to which 
circular migration would be an alternative to irregular immigration and an incentive for 
readmission – was later on confirmed by the Commission Communication (COM(2007) 248) on 
circular migration and mobility partnerships.  
Security is also very much embedded in the provisions of the partnerships themselves. The 
preferential treatment that they are said to provide is only conferred to those states showing 
robust commitments in the management of irregular immigration, notably concerning the 
signature of readmission agreements. The conditions for having access to the kind of circular 
mobility stipulated in mobility partnerships is therefore showing a willingness to cooperate in 
the field of security as it has been classically understood by the EC and its member states. As 
explained by the Communication COM(2007) 248, the EC would expect from third countries a 
commitment to “fighting illegal immigration…where appropriate in the framework of an EC 
readmission agreement”.
74 This commitment would cover other security measures to prevent 
irregular immigration, such as improving border controls, the security of travel documents and 
cooperating in the exchange of information among law enforcement authorities. 
In addition to the more traditional security policies overlapping with immigration, this paper 
argues that the kind of labour immigration policy promoted by mobility partnerships is also 
driven by a prevailing securitarian approach, mainly from the viewpoint of the EU member 
states. What kind of legal and labour immigration policy has been developed within the 
partnership framework? Since 2003, the European Commission has argued that the kind of 
human mobility to be promoted in the context of external relations would be of a temporary and 
circular nature. The latter was already present the first time the Commission referred to the 
concept of circular migration in the Communication on migration and development 
(COM(2005) 390). The concept of circularity is one that views migration as predominantly 
temporary, whereby return to the country of origin of the migrant worker remains a central 
factor. The EC offer, comprising for instance labour quotas and matching or more favourable 
treatment for legal admission, has been infused with the political priorities (irregular 
immigration) and economic needs (labour market shortages) of the participating EU member 
states. Hence, there is a mismatch between the Commission’s interest in promoting the global 
approach and the economic interests of member states. 
Therefore, the labour immigration policy that is being developed in the external dimension is 
one in which the security of the Union and particularly that of its member states remains a 
priority. Circularity constitutes another strategy to manage mobility in a temporary manner by 
the state and the EC. This management strategy does not have freedom of movement or mobility 
at the heart of its ambitions, but rather acts as another mechanism for controlling migration in a 
temporary and non-permanent fashion. As stated by the European Commission in the 
Communication on circular migration (COM(2007) 248), third-country workers “must re-
establish their main residence and their main activity in their country of origin”.
75 Circular 
migration actually means a security policy arguing for the temporary and ‘recurrent’ 
employment of workers; settlement and social inclusion are not at the centre of the discussion 
and are actually conceived as an undesired result that challenges the objectives of the policy. 
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3.  Putting circular migration into practice? The mobility partnerships 
with Moldova and Cape Verde 
It is striking to see how the policy discourses and political ambitions calling for the 
development of circular migration and the inclusion of labour policies in cooperation efforts 
with third countries through mobility partnerships have so far had difficulty in materialising in 
actual normative outputs. Up to now, only two pilot partnerships have been concluded – with 
Moldova and Cape Verde. The one with Georgia is still under negotiation and it appears that the 
one with Senegal is currently experiencing some obstacles preventing any progress. It is thus 
important to evaluate the ways in which the existing mobility partnerships have framed circular 
migration and developed legal channels for third-country workers into the EU. This section 
analyses the main circular migration initiatives and structures dealing with employment-related 
policies in the partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde. It reviews the ways in which circular 
migration schemes are meant to be put into practice through these two partnerships. The 
Commission scoreboard originally foreseen for June 2009, offering an evaluation of their first 
year of implementation, was presented on 18 September 2009 in the Commission Staff Working 
Document on “Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration” 
(SEC(2009) 1240).
76 While acknowledging the early stage of partnerships, it is surprising to see 
how the latter actually constitutes a political (non-independent) assessment promoting the added 
value of mobility partnerships that is far from an actual ‘evaluation’ of the workability and 
effectiveness of all the activities and projects provided by the partnerships. Our analysis 
therefore mainly focuses on the scarce information provided by the Joint Declarations and the 
Commission Staff Working Document, as well as some of the outputs from the interviews that 
were conducted with EU officials and practitioners in Brussels in the context of this paper. 
The adoption of the Joint Declarations on mobility partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde 
in May 2008
77 provided the legal foundations for the possibility to develop circular migration 
schemes. Moldova and Cape Verde share one characteristic as pilot countries for the launch of 
the mobility partnerships, which is their willingness to cooperate with the EC. This might have 
constituted a major factor justifying their selection as the first set of third countries to inaugurate 
the process. Nonetheless, Moldova and Cape Verde differ substantially in their associated 
frameworks of cooperation with the EC, with the former being a partner in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the latter a member of the ACP countries. Both countries can 
be considered among the ‘best students’ of the class among the group of states participating in 
each of these policy frameworks, particularly concerning cooperation on migration and security. 
Moreover, Moldova has already achieved a substantial degree of cooperation on migration with 
the EC. The conclusion of readmission and visa facilitation agreements and the opening of the 
Common Visa Application Centre are illustrative of the intensity of EC–Moldovan relations in 
this domain.
78 Furthermore, since December 2007, the EU has had a special partnership with 
Cape Verde.
79 Yet the level cooperation on migration has been mainly channelled and 
                                                      
76 See the Commission Staff Working Document (European Commission, 2009b), op. cit. 
77 See Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European 
Union and Moldova, 9460/08, Brussels, 21 May 2008(b), and also Council of the European Union, Joint 
Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and Cape Verde, 9460/08 Add 2, 
Brussels, 21 May 2008(c). 
78 See the Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and 
the Republic of Moldova on the readmission of persons residing without authorization, 13765/07, 
Brussels, 20 November 2007. For information on the Common Visa Application Centre refer to 
http://www.cac.md. 
79 See the European Commission’s website on “Development and relations with African, Caribbean and 
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developed by one member state – Portugal – with whom Cape Verde shares colonial ties, 
implying close trade cooperation and the presence of the majority of the Cape Verdean diaspora 
on Portuguese soil.  
Concerning the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Joint Declarations with Moldova and 
Cape Verde, the political mandate from the Council was granted to the Commission in 
December 2007, after both states showed interest in becoming pilot countries in the adoption of 
the mobility partnerships by submitting ‘non-papers’ to the DG JFS. Moldova was quite active 
when presenting its candidature for a pilot mobility partnership. It submitted three non-papers to 
the European Commission. The first two were presented before Moldova was actually selected 
as a candidate for a partnership in December 2007. The first non-paper dates from 29 June 2007, 
just one month after the Commission Communication on circular migration and mobility 
partnerships (COM(2007) 248) was published in May 2007. In this first non-paper, Moldova 
expressed its interest in the launch of negotiations and in becoming one of the pilot countries for 
the mobility partnerships and “the emerging policy on circular migration”.
80 The non-paper also 
stressed the importance of all the institutional reforms that it had already undertaken in the 
migration field (“efficient management of migration flows”) towards the implementation of the 
2005 ENP Action Plan.
81  
In the second non-paper issued on 24 August 2007, and in the drafting of which the IOM was 
presumably involved, Moldova presented a proposal for the mobility partnership and a list of 
elements as a basis for negotiating the package, following the content of the May 2007 
Communication. It needs to be recognised that the IOM has greatly contributed to the 
conceptual background behind the development of the circular migration model.
82 The second 
non-paper centred on the ways in which the concept of circular migration could be developed 
and implemented in the context of the EC–Moldova pilot partnership. Among the measures 
proposed, it referred to the promotion of circular migration schemes for Moldovan citizens 
settled in the EC and those residing in Moldova, the development bilateral programmes of 
temporary work, training and study schemes with specific EU member states, and the 
conclusion of bilateral agreements with EU member states on circular migration, labour 
migration and social protection. It added that circular migration schemes would need to be 
developed with a wide range of actors from governmental, civil society, NGO and international 
organisations such as the IOM.  
Indeed, the circular migration scheme proposed by the second non-paper included several 
references to the IOM and its role in the implementation of (circular) labour migration 
                                                                                                                                                            
profile.cfm?cid=cv&type=short&lng=en). Refer also to Council of the European Union, Council Decision 
authorising the Commission to open negotiations for the conclusion of a readmission agreement between 
the European Community and the Republic of Cape Verde, 10461/09, 29 May 2009. 
80 The first non-paper, on initiating the negotiations on the pilot circular migration and mobility 
partnership between the European Community and Moldova, was issued on 29 June 2007 (Chisinau). The 
second non-paper, on Moldovan proposals on launching the EU–Moldova mobility partnership and the 
pilot implementation of circular migration, was issued on 24 August 2007. The third non-paper, on the 
Moldovan position on the Moldova–EU mobility partnership, was issued on 18 February 2008. 
81 See the reference documents for the ENP at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.  
82 See International Organization for Migration, World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of 
International Migration, IOM, Geneva, 2005; refer also to the Global Commission on International 
Migration (GCIM), Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action, GCIM, Geneva, 
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schemes,
83 and here it was proposed as one of the key agents taking part in the recruitment and 
assistance provided to selected workers participating in circular migration schemes. Once the 
negotiations with Moldova officially started, however, it appears that some EU member states 
(and Moldova itself!) were against the deployment of circular migration schemes, and as 
discussed below, only the Czech Republic and Cyprus finally proposed to implement circular 
migration initiatives. Indeed, the third non-paper issued by Moldova after the conclusion of the 
mobility partnership, which specified the main starting points of the package, included no 
express mention of circular migration.
84 
Until the date of formal adoption of the mobility partnership, the Commission campaigned for 
the involvement of as many member states as possible in the initiatives. The participation of EU 
member states was rather divergent when comparing the partnership with Moldova with that of 
Cape Verde. In the case of Moldova, 15 member states decided to join in, while in the 
partnership with Cape Verde only 4 member states initially participated. The reason underlying 
this differentiation might have to do with the fact that there are only a few EU member states 
with any interests in Cape Verde. These were namely Portugal, Spain, France and Luxembourg. 
In any case, both Joint Declarations specifically state that the mobility partnerships are 
conceived as “an open-ended or long-term framework based on political dialogue”, which will 
therefore evolve over time and which remains open to any other member states wishing to 
participate.
85 For example, the Netherlands joined the mobility partnership with Cape Verde a 
few months after its signature, as it is also one of the EU member states with a major Cape 
Verdean community on its soil.  
As regards the general content of the mobility partnerships, the two Joint Declarations start with 
the same preamble. It states that the signatories (i.e. the EC, participating EU member states and 
the third country) confirm their commitment to facilitate the movement of persons between the 
EU and the third state “whilst working to ensure better management of migration flows 
including illegal migration flows”. Furthermore, the preamble highlights that the partnerships 
are based on the principle of reciprocity and that they bear the objectives 
of facilitating the movement of persons between their territories, as well as legal 
migration,  in particular circular and temporary migration, developing genuine 
cooperation on migration and development, and preventing and combating illegal 
immigration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, including the 
promotion of an effective readmission and return policy, while respecting human rights 
and taking into account the situation of migrants and the socio-economic development 
of the Signatories.
86 (Emphasis added.)  
Both partnerships also begin with a similar corpus of migration-related themes, around which 
the level of cooperation is expected to be developed. In particular, they identify three policy 
domains where more dialogue and cooperation will take place: first, “mobility, legal migration 
and integration”; second, “migration and development”; and third, “border management, 
                                                      
83 According to the non-paper, this would include for instance recruitment requests placed by employers 
with selected recruitment agencies and the IOM. The latter would carry out the pre-selection process and 
the final selection would be conducted by the employers themselves.  
84 The priority areas highlighted were foreign direct investments, reintegration and return programmes, 
investments in education, investments of migrants’ remittances and local area support, consolidation of 
the national migration management system, a visa dialogue package and diaspora consolidation. 
85 See paras. 12 and 13 of the mobility partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 
2008b), op. cit. and paras. 14 and 15 of the mobility partnership with Cape Verde (Council of the 
European Union, 2008c), op. cit. 
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identity and travel documents, [and the] fight against illegal immigration and trafficking of 
human beings”. Regarding the nexus between circular and labour migration, the official 
discourses used in the partnerships when explaining the content of the first two policy domains 
are very similar. Both texts state the political priority of “promot[ing] a better framework for 
legal mobility”, which would be supported by the provision of information, integration and 
protection for migrants “while exploiting and matching labour market opportunities”.
87 The 
partnership with Moldova has added to that a further important phrase: “fully respecting 
Member States’ competences in this field and taking into account the different labour market 
situations in the Republic of Moldova and the Member States”. 
The way the mobility partnerships frame the issue of “migration and development” in relation to 
labour migration policy is also identical. They refer to the need to mitigate the negative effects 
of brain drain and the emigration of those labelled as ‘highly skilled or qualified persons’ and 
call for the promotion of temporary and return migration. The partnership with Cape Verde even 
proposes the development of permanent return policies of “highly qualified Cape Verdean 
migrants and European nationals of Cape Verdean origin”.
88 The partnership with Moldova 
alludes to the possible adoption of “codes of ethical recruitment”.
89 Both instruments underline 
the need to facilitate the recognition of qualifications and skills, training, and temporary 
exchange and work programmes. Finally, they emphasise the importance of supporting 
“voluntary return” by putting into place appropriate mechanisms. In this same point, the 
partnership with Moldova expressly refers to tailored circular migration schemes.
90  
The annexes attached at the end of the mobility partnerships present the list of proposed 
initiatives and activities conceived for the implementation of the political priorities identified in 
the preamble and the main body of principles. What are the precise proposals dealing with 
circular and labour migration?  
Circular migration initiatives are almost absent in the mobility partnership with Moldova. So 
far, the only project dealing explicitly with this concept that has been foreseen is a proposal by 
the Czech Republic and Cyprus, which is supposed to offer circular migration projects bearing 
in mind support for the reintegration of returning migrants.
91 This same proposal is envisaged as 
being partially carried out in the context of another initiative that would involve 11 of the 15 
participating member states.
92 The latter is aimed at strengthening Moldova’s capacity to 
manage labour and return migration, mainly through the provision of information on routes for 
legal migration to the EU and employment in the EU member states.
93 More specifically, it aims 
at addressing information on legal entry and stay in the EC and the Schengen area, and 
“employment referral mechanisms, job counselling, mediation and information on work 
opportunities in cooperation with the employment services of certain participating Member 
States”.
94 The only extra information provided by the political evaluation conducted by the 
                                                      
87 See p. 3, para. 1 of both mobility partnerships (Council of the European Union, 2008b and 2008c), op. 
cit.  
88 See para. 7 of the partnership with Cape Verde (Council of the European Union, 2008c), op. cit. 
89 See para. 7 of the partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 2008b), op. cit. 
90 Ibid., para. 6 of the partnership with Moldova.  
91 Ibid. – see the Annex on the proposed activities of the EU–Moldova Joint Declaration on a Mobility 
Partnership, p. 11, point 4(ii).  
92 Ibid., p. 10, point 3(i). The countries involved in this initiative are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Italy, Germany, Greece, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. 
93 Refer to the website on “Strengthen Moldova’s capacity to manage labor and return migration” (at 
http://www.legal-in.eu). 
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European Commission in the Staff Working Document on “Mobility Partnerships as a tool of 
the Global Approach to Migration” (SEC(2009) 1240) is that “some Member States offered to 
change their national legislation to facilitate circular migration of Moldovan citizens”.
95 
As regards other activities related to labour migration schemes, the mobility partnership with 
Moldova includes a proposal by Romania and the Veneto Region to launch active measures in 
support of labour migration for the benefit of Moldova. Also included are proposals by Italy, 
Sweden and Poland, involving initiatives dealing with access by Moldovan workers to their 
labour markets. The only information provided by the annex is the following: Italy has proposed 
a project providing support for potential migrants and promoting a sector-specific approach. 
Similarly, Poland has proposed to offer admission to the Polish labour market for temporary 
work without the need to hold a work permit. The Swedish proposal consists of the 
development of a pilot project disseminating information about the recruitment of Moldovan 
workers in certain sectors.
96 In section 6, which deals with “[d]iaspora consolidation and co-
development”, one proposal by Germany consists of extended absences being allowed to legally 
residing Moldovans without loss of rights of residence.
97 Finally, on “labour market matching”, 
the mobility partnership includes three initiatives. One of these entails “the intention of the 
Moldovan public employment services to provide incentives regarding local job opportunities 
for its citizens, notably the young, and to improve labour market matching with the support of 
Sweden”. Another one is a proposal by the Czech Republic to support private and small 
enterprises in order to create labour opportunities in rural regions. A third one is a proposal by 
Romania to conclude bilateral projects for small and medium-sized enterprises to promote the 
creation of job opportunities in tourism and rural development.
98 
An analysis of the proposed activities in the framework of the mobility partnership with Cape 
Verde provides a rather different picture from that of Moldova. Circular migration patterns seem 
to operate already between Portugal and the insular state. On the one hand, Portugal is willing to 
continue its support to “DIAS de Cabo Verde – DIASpora for Development of Cape Verde”,
99 a 
project promoted by the Instituto das Comunidades de Cabo Verde (IC) and which is already 
co-funded by the EC under the AENEAS Programme
100 and the Portuguese government. The 
                                                      
95 Refer to p. 5 of the Commission Staff Working Document (European Commission, 2009b), op. cit. It 
appears that Germany is among these member states. 
96 Refer to p. 12 of the partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 2008b), op. cit. 
97 Ibid. The precise wording is “Proposal by Germany to offer Moldovans who legally reside in Germany, 
and who meet the relevant conditions, special leave for extended absences without loss of rights and 
residence” (p. 13). 
98 See para. 8(iii) of the mobility partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 2008b), op. 
cit.). 
99 The project aimed at “strengthening the capacity and the competencies of the professionals working in 
key development sectors in Cape Verde, through the promotion of the Diaspora’s role in Portugal, Italy 
and The Netherlands to act as development agents”. One of the main activities of the project was to set up 
a database “to store the competences and skills of Cape Verdeans living abroad and the needs identified in 
the country of origin”. The database offers the possibility to any member of the Cape Verdean community 
in Portugal, Italy or the Netherlands falling within the category of ‘skilled professional’ in certain sectors 
(education, health, infrastructure and tourism) to register their “professional competences” and apply for 
vacancies in the selected group of EU member states. Refer to the general factsheet of the project 
(retrieved from http://www.diasdecaboverde.org). 
100 The AENEAS Programme covered financial and technical assistance for migration and asylum 
between 2004 and 2006, which has since been replaced by the Thematic Programme of Cooperation with 
Third Countries in the Areas of Migration and Asylum (see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ 
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project is implemented by the IOM and aims at fostering the circular migration of highly 
qualified migrants. Spain has proposed to contribute to “these [same] efforts” by supporting 
another IC project called “Mobilising Cape Verdean Skills Abroad”. On the other hand, 
Portugal intends to foster the admission of “certain categories of Cape Verdean workers, 
particularly on a temporary basis and with a view to circular migration” with the signing of a 
new protocol amending the existing one between the countries on the temporary migration of 
Cape Verdeans to work in Portugal, dating back to 18 February 1997.
101 In the same vein, 
France proposed to open a number of professional activities to migrants from Cape Verde and to 
“no longer maintain objections based on the employment situation in the sectors concerned”, 
which was expected to become one of the components of a bilateral agreement between the two 
countries.
102 Finally, Luxembourg has also proposed to launch circular migration schemes with 
Cape Verde, but no further specifications are provided about these schemes in the mobility 
partnership.
103 
The annexes on “proposed activities” in both partnerships include other initiatives that may also 
have direct or indirect implications for labour and temporary migration schemes. Among others, 
the following ones can be highlighted: 
•  Projects supporting administrative capacity or capacity building, technical assistance 
and information provision. For example, the mobility partnership with Moldova foresees 
some proposals for developing the Moldovan labour market, which have as a general 
objective “optimizing the labour market of Moldova, promoting student and professional 
exchanges and improving the economic conditions for returning migrants”. By way of 
illustration, initiatives falling under this objective cover horizontal support (e.g. two 
projects led by Sweden on the reform of vocational training and another one – in 
cooperation with Romania and Lithuania – aimed at strengthening support for the public 
employment service) and enhancing the capacity of higher education institutions (e.g. 
promoting exchange programmes).
104  
The partnership with Cape Verde includes the expansion and development of the 
competences of the existing “Centro de Apoio ao Migrante no País de Origem” 
(CAMPO).
105 Under the mobility partnership, the project would extend its coverage to the 
provision of information to would-be migrants on legal migration possibilities in the 
participating EU member states, on employment opportunities there, pre-departure 
preparation and training services.
106 The instrument also calls for the further development 
of existing partnerships between the University of Cape Verde and higher education 
institutions in the participating EU member states “to promote the exchange of students 
and teaching staff, particularly through the award of grants”.
107 
                                                      
101 See p. 9, point 2(ii) of the mobility partnership with Cape Verde (Council of the European Union, 
2008c), op. cit. 
102 Ibid., para. 2(v). 
103 Ibid., p. 10, point 2(viii). 
104 See points 8(i) to 8(iv) of the mobility partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 
2008b), op. cit. 
105 For further information, see the CAMPO website (http://www.aipaglobal.com). 
106 See para. 2(i) of the partnership with Cape Verde (Council of the European Union, 2008c), op. cit. 
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•  Bilateral agreements. The partnership with Moldova contains a proposal (having a 
conditional nature) by Bulgaria to sign an agreement on the regulation of labour 
migration and another by Romania to conclude a convention on local border traffic.
108 
Furthermore, Bulgaria proposed to conclude a bilateral treaty with Moldova on social 
insurance, as did Romania on social security.
109 The partnership with Cape Verde 
includes a proposal by Portugal to develop bilateral cooperation instruments to simplify 
and boost the efficiency of worker migration procedures between the Portuguese 
Republic’s Institute for Employment and Vocational Training and its Cape Verdean 
counterpart.
110 
•  Training activities, seminars, study visits and exchange of information. Greece proposed 
in the partnership with Moldova a technical training workshop on residence and work 
permit legislation for civil servants from Moldova. Hungary also envisaged ‘capacity 
building’ (including seminars, information exchange and study trips).
111 
•  Integration facilities. The partnership with Moldova provides an initiative by Greece to 
offer “pre-departure training for Moldovans planning to migrate” and a proposal by Italy 
“to elaborate and disseminate a handbook on entry procedures and integration 
policies”.
112 In the partnership with Cape Verde, there is a proposal by Luxembourg to 
develop a programme on “Migrating with Open Eyes”, in order “to familiarize future 
Cape Verdean migrants under family reunification with the social, linguistic and other 
realities of life in Luxembourg”.
113 
•  Social support. According to the partnership with Moldova, Italy proposed to address the 
social dimension of migration in Moldova “by focusing on teenagers and by supporting 
centres/operators that provide assistance to teenagers left in [the] country by migrant 
parents”.
114 The partnership with Cape Verde includes an initiative by Spain to develop a 
schools/workshops programme “aimed at facilitating the integration of apprentices, 
particularly through training actions tailored to the Cape Verdean labour market, to meet 
labour needs identified by that country…and to support initiatives by women”.
115  
•  Websites. In the partnership with Moldova, Greece, Poland, Germany and Lithuania 
proposed to create a website on legal migration. 
                                                      
108 Refer to point 4(iii) of the mobility partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 
2008b), op. cit. 
109 Ibid. – see para. 7(ii); see also para. 10(i), in which Portugal proposed to conclude a bilateral 
agreement on the exchange of information, technical assistance and training in the areas of document 
security and border controls. 
110 Para. 2(iii) of the partnership with Cape Verde (Council of the European Union, 2008c), op. cit. 
111 Para. 2(ii) of the partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 2008b), op. cit. Para. 2(v) 
also deals with the “sharing of knowledge and best practices” and includes a joint proposal by the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden to organise study visits and exchanges of 
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112 Ibid., point 3(ii) of the partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 2008b), op. cit. 
113 See para. 2(ix) of the partnership with Cape Verde (Council of the European Union, 2008c), op. cit.; 
see also the website of the Luxembourg ministry of foreign affairs (http://www.mae.lu/fr/Site-
MAE/Actualites/Visite-de-travail-au-Luxembourg-de-Jose-Brito-ministre-des-Affaires-etrangeres-du-
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114 Para. 7(iii) of the mobility partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 2008b), op. cit. 
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4.  ‘Insecurity’ partnerships for policy coherency and the rights of 
migrant workers 
This section examines the main deficits characterising the nature and effects of mobility 
partnerships from the perspective of a (circular) labour migration policy. There are three major 
issues of concern, stemming from the analysis carried out in section 3 above: first, policy 
coordination; second, differentiation and policy incoherence; and third, migrant workers’ rights.  
4.1  Policy coordination and soft law 
Mobility partnerships are articulated as joint declarations, which represent new policy tools at 
the EU level of a non-legally binding nature for the participating EU member states. These 
partnerships are not sources of international law but rather fall within the category of ‘soft law’ 
(or even soft policy) and constitute an alternative and new mechanism of governance intending 
to move Europeanisation forward through methods different from those already provided by the 
Treaties.
116 The role of the DG JFS is mainly to conduct the negotiations with third countries, 
after receiving the green light from the Council and in cooperation with the presidency, and 
trying to ensure the overall coordination and consistency of the combined EC offer based on the 
individual proposals and political priorities expressed by each participating member state. 
At first glance, the juridical softness of mobility partnerships may be surprising in view of the 
EC legal competence to conclude international agreements covering migration aspects. Indeed, 
as highlighted in section 2 of this paper, the EC has already concluded various readmission 
agreements with third countries, which have been grounded on Arts. 63.3(b) and 300.3 of the 
EC Treaty.
117 It would be difficult to sustain that the EC has a recognised implicit competence 
only to conclude agreements with non-EU countries on irregular immigration, including (in the 
words of the Treaty) the “repatriation of illegal residents” and not on labour immigration policy 
based on Arts. 63.3(a) and 63.4 of the EC Treaty.
118 As the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
held on several occasions, the Community’s power to conclude international agreements is not 
only based on the express powers conferred by the Treaties, but can also be implicit in other 
articles of the Treaties or from other legislative measures adopted at the EC level.
119 
Furthermore, the ECJ has confirmed that there will be implicit competence in those cases where 
public European responses would be necessary to attain one of the objectives enshrined in the 
                                                      
116 On the concept of governance in the external dimension of the EU’s justice and home affairs policies, 
refer to T. Balzacq, “The Frontiers of Governance: Understanding the External Dimension of EU Justice 
and Home Affairs”, in T. Balzacq (ed.), The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: 
Governance, Neighbours, Security, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, London: Palgrave, 2009, 
pp. 1-32. 
117 See S. Peers, “Irregular Immigration and EU External Relations”, in B. Bogusz, R. Cholewinski, A. 
Cygan and E. Szyszczak (eds), Irregular Immigration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and 
International Perspectives, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, pp. 193-219; see also S. Peers and 
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Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, pp. 881-895.  
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legally resident in a Member State may reside in other Member States”. 
119 See M. Cremona, EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective, European University 
Institute Working Papers Law 2008/4, European University Institute, Florence, 2008(a); see also M. 
Cremona,  Circular Migration: A Legal Perspective, CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 2008/30, 
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Treaties, and this would be the case even in those situations where there is not an express 
allocation of competence.
120  
The main approach in the format for developing the external dimensions of the EU’s labour 
immigration policy is that of intergovernmentalism. The political nature of mobility partnerships 
as declarations of intent is a direct expression of the great care at the EU official level to make 
clear to the participating member states that any externalisation processes relating to labour 
immigration policy will ‘strictly’ comply with the division of competences between the EC and 
member states, as well as the different labour market situations and needs in each one. The 
academic literature has already extensively addressed the tensions between nationalism, 
intergovernmentalism and Europeanisation in the harmonisation of labour immigration policies 
at the EU level.
121 These are policy domains where political priorities and official discourses at 
the EU level have had difficulty in manifesting into actual normative outputs. An example of the 
resistance by EU member states to transferring one further drop of their domestic competences 
and discretional powers to the EU level was the Decision (2004/927/EC) adopted by the Council 
in December 2004. According to that Decision, all the areas falling within the scope of Title IV 
of the EC Treaty, with the sole exception of those related to legal migration, would benefit from 
the co-decision procedure and qualified majority voting provided in Art. 251 EC Treaty.
122 
While the internal dimensions of the EU’s labour immigration policy remain contested, their 
external facets are subject to similar or even larger dilemmas.  
The normative softness inherent in the rationale of the mobility partnerships was therefore 
considered a fundamental condition for having ‘more Europe’ in the inclusion of (circular) 
labour migration provisions in the externalisation processes of the EU’s immigration policy. 
Yet, the policy coordination system that underlies their soft nature presents profound 
implications in relation to their effectiveness. The partnerships with both Moldova and Cape 
Verde only state that “with a view of implementing the Mobility Partnership, the Signatories 
confirm their intentions with regard to the initiatives set out in the Annex, subject to their 
available financial means”.
123 The joint declaration regime prevents the European Commission 
from guaranteeing the enforcement of any of the activities and initiatives proposed by the EU 
member states. Their national sovereignty remains utterly intact in the context of these 
partnerships. The technical and political monitoring mechanisms that have been foreseen do not 
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IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure set 
out in Art. 251 of that Treaty, OJ L 396/45, 31.12.2004. 
123 See para. 15 of the mobility partnership with Moldova (Council of the European Union, 2008b), op. 
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overcome this vulnerability.
124 The degree of discretion and margin of appreciation by national 
authorities is simply too large to ensure any coordinated effort at the EU level. 
Joint declarations endanger a good relationship between mobility partnerships and the rule of 
law and the principle of legal certainty. The related negotiations and implementation have 
marginalised any sort of democratic accountability at the EU and national levels. It is striking to 
see that the European Parliament was completely absent in any process leading to the 
conclusion of the mobility partnerships with Moldova and Cape Verde. In addition to this clear 
democratic deficit, the extent to which these partnerships can be subject to any judicial control 
exercised by the ECJ or national tribunals is also doubtful. The principle of legal certainty is an 
issue of concern as well. This general principle of EC law demands that individuals need to 
know the legal consequences of their actions and that the quality of the law is as high and 
objective as possible in order to prevent exceptionalism by public authorities beyond any remits 
of legality.
125 It is not clear that the partnerships meet these conditions or that a person affected 
by abusive or illicit practices by the public authorities of a participating EU member state will 
have a right to seek an effective remedy.
126 As long as the partnerships constitute an EC offer 
coordinated by the European Commission, the latter is also under the obligation to verify that 
the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty are duly met in their practical 
implementation – which at present remains far from clear.  
The political desire of moving Europeanisation forward in these areas might have justified the 
rapidity when moving ahead in their negotiations without perhaps properly assessing the legal 
and human consequences. This is not an exception in EU integration processes, where to date 
the idea of a ‘Europe of results and achievements’ has been the guiding logic, sometimes 
without paying too much attention to the effects that urgency in policy-making may have for the 
liberty and security of the individual and policy coherency. The policy coordination regime 
envisaged in mobility partnerships and their complex legal nature fundamentally challenge the 
system of guarantees and mechanisms of protection (and legal security) that have been 
conferred to the EC system by the Treaties. Indeed, while mobility partnerships now represent a 
tangible example of EC policy-making in a kind of external dimension of the EU’s migration 
policy, aiming at the combination of security and mobility, from a rule-of-law perspective they 
bring about more insecurity in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. 
4.2  Differentiation and policy incoherency 
Mobility partnerships include different groups of member states that have shown interest in 
cooperating with the particular third country concerned and a series of proposals intended to put 
into practice (circular) labour migration policies in the EU’s external relations. What are the 
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effects of this differentiation on the coherency and goals purported by the common EU 
immigration policy internally and externally?  
The various speeds or variable geometry applied in the context of mobility partnerships in terms 
of EU member states’ participation is purely driven by their political and economic interests in 
relation to the non-EU state involved. The partnership with Moldova counts the participation of 
15 EU member states and the one with Cape Verde only 5. We have qualified Moldova and 
Cape Verde as the ‘good students’ of the class taking into account their eagerness to cooperate 
with the EC and that they are not considered major sources of irregular immigration towards the 
EU. The international arena, however, is composed of ‘other students’.
127 The African and 
Mediterranean regions continue to be framed as a political priority at the EU level in the scope 
of the global approach to migration and particularly in the context of readmission and border 
control policies. Therefore, one might wonder about the extent to which the conditions for 
negotiation and EU member state participation – the exportability of the mobility partnership 
model – is going to end up being a lost battle when dealing for instance with other African 
countries that do not meet the eligibility criteria. As stated by the European Commission in its 
Staff Working Document SEC(2009) 1240, these criteria are “the geographical balance between 
Eastern Europe and Africa, the importance of migration flows from or through the country to 
the EU, the readiness to cooperate on readmission and fight against illegal immigration, the 
interest of EU Member States to cooperate with the country in question and its interest to enter 
such a partnership”.
128 The differentiation of participation by EU member states and in the lists 
of proposals in the partnerships could become huge, which would make the regime and 
purposes of mobility partnerships simply unsustainable in the long term. 
In addition, these partnerships cannot be comprehensively understood from a purely state-
centric approach. The picture is far more complex. The external dimensions of the EU’s 
immigration policy go beyond pure state-to-state and EC institutional interests. The early and 
continuing role played by other intergovernmental and non-governmental actors (such as the 
IOM, International Centre for Migration Policy Development and the Fundación Internacional y 
para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas) has been very important. Their 
involvement adds to the complexity and obscurity of the mobility partnership regime in light of 
the multiplicity of the interests, agendas and actors involved in the transnational governance of 
migration. As discussed in the previous sections of this paper, the role of the IOM in promoting 
the concept of circular migration has been evident since 2005. There is a wide patchwork of 
non-state and non-EU institutional actors driving the circular migration agenda at the EU level 
and putting the mobility partnerships into practice. The mandate and status of these actors place 
them among the main beneficiaries of EC and member state funding for making the mobility 
partnerships and circular migration schemes work on the ground in the third country. This 
situation has been further promoted by the Commission Staff Working Document SEC(2009) 
1240, in its preliminary assessment of the pilot phase of the partnerships with Moldova and 
Cape Verde: “It is also foreseen that local coordination should be extended to other actors (such 
as NGOs and international organisations) active [in] migration in the third countries 
concerned.”
129 
Furthermore, as explained above, mobility partnerships constitute a mechanism offering the 
possibility to all EU member states to cooperate with a given third state and bring under the 
common EC umbrella enshrined in a joint declaration a package of fragmented cooperation 
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initiatives promoted by some member states. A number of these proposals are supposed to cover 
not only temporary and circular migration policies, but also issues as diverse as projects 
supporting administrative capacity, technical assistance, information provision and exchange, 
bilateral agreements, training, seminars, study visits, integration facilities and policies, social 
support and even the set-up of websites. The European Commission has highlighted in the same 
Staff Working Document that 
as the experience has shown, the partnerships risk being a collation of new and already 
planned activities and additional effort should be made so that the package offered to a 
partner is an effective and coordinated offer bringing added value to existing 
cooperation, as the future aim should be to reinforce coordination and bring real added 
value to the existing cooperation.
130  
Indeed, the price that the European Commission has had to pay to have some degree of ‘Europe’ 
in this policy dimension has been to allow mobility partnerships to become a tool at the service 
of the member states’ security and domestic interests. Yet, do these priorities correspond with 
the goals of the EU immigration policy? While the preamble and main body of the partnerships 
seek to be coherent and present a common set of objectives to guide their development, the 
annexes attached to each one bring about an over-elastic and diversified menu of activities, 
which end up being a shopping list of distinct and hugely divergent domestic priorities. Also, 
the description provided in each of the specific proposals and activities is so limited that it is 
difficult to envisage how and according to which criteria their effectiveness, success and added 
value are going to be measured and objectively evaluated.  
This combination of differentiation in participation and heterogeneity in the objectives and 
nature of the activities proposed by the mobility partnerships creates divisions on multiple levels 
that pose serious problems for the policy coherency of this regime. Such risks are further 
substantiated when looking at how the partnerships cover and seek to put into practice regular 
channels for (circular) labour migration. The translation into law of the political discourses 
studied in section 2 of this paper, in which circular migration is connected with mobility 
partnerships, is another area of concern, which is likely to grow as soon as the EC starts 
negotiating such partnerships with other third countries viewed as sources of irregular 
immigration. The desire to integrate regular and labour-related migration provisions in the 
framework of the EU’s external relations – from the perspectives of circular migration and the 
linking of migration and development – has so far only materialised in the two partnerships with 
Moldova and Cape Verde. Furthermore, as shown in the previous section, even within the 
context of these two partnerships, the extent to which circular migration initiatives have been 
included remains very limited and in a majority of cases inexistent.  
All this leads to a general picture undermining the coherency and legitimacy of the EC, and its 
migration policy within its borders and abroad. Mobility partnerships thus represent insecurity 
policy tools for the EU’s labour immigration policy. The differentiation entailed puts at risk the 
coherency of the EU’s labour immigration policy, as well as the uniformity and legitimacy of 
mobility partnerships themselves, in light of the progressive building of a linkage between the 
internal and external facets of the EU’s common (regular) immigration and external relations 
policies.  
4.3  ‘Moving in circles’ and the rights of third-country workers 
In this section, we go back to the question raised in the introduction of this paper: Whose 
security and mobility are at the heart of the mobility partnerships? The intertwining of mobility 
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partnerships and circular migration measures at the EU level puts the third-country worker in a 
vulnerable and insecure position in relation to the EC and its member states, as well as his/her 
state of origin.
131 These instruments represent insecurity partnerships for TCNs because of two 
features of their underlying logic:  
First, a temporal view of migration. The concept of circular migration aims at regulating human 
mobility in a ‘recurrent’ and temporary way.
132 The intended public goal behind it views 
permanent residence, family reunion and social integration as deviations challenging the 
policy’s effectiveness.
133 Return and readmission are fundamental conditions for the circularity 
to work in practice. Mobility partnerships seek to implement a managerial strategy over human 
mobility, which intends to keep labour immigration a seasonal or temporary phenomenon for 
certain categories of workers.
134 Circular migration is a return to the public authorities’ illusion 
that migration can be controlled as a temporary phenomenon, and now even as a circular one for 
people to go back and forth from their respective countries of origin. The third-country workers 
will be expected ‘to move in circles’. In the negative phase, the circular or circulating migrants 
will be obliged to go back to their country of origin after the expiration of the temporary 
residence and work permit in the EU member state involved. Those workers who might benefit 
from one of these (circular) labour migration initiatives and who do not voluntarily comply with 
the predetermined circular migration scheme (and overstay in an irregular status in the EU 
member state) will be penalised by expulsion from the EU and potential sanctions in their home 
country.
135 These sanctions will range from no longer being able to benefit from circular 
migration schemes to facing the penalties envisaged in national law for the phenomenon of 
irregular immigration, which in some third countries is deemed a criminal offence. There have 
been certain arguments sustaining the idea that as long as there seems to be some evidence 
showing that international human mobility is increasingly temporal, the concept of circular 
migration could work well as a policy option.
136 But the fact that people are increasingly mobile 
does not mean that all human mobility towards the EU for employment-related purposes should 
be put into the basket of ‘circularity’ and managed by the state as an inherently temporary 
circumstance. 
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Second, the rationale of selection. Mobility partnerships only cover a limited number of 
categories of third-country workers who would be able to benefit from facilitated mobility into 
the participating EU member states. These partnerships and circular migration policies are 
driven by the labour market forces of demand and supply as perceived by the EU member 
states. TCNs are therefore not treated as workers and holders of human rights, but rather as 
financial units (or numbers) at the service of the economic and labour market needs of the 
states. The sociology surrounding the mobility and settlement of individuals, the interests of 
third-country workers and the measures preventing exploitation and guaranteeing proper 
working conditions are not at the centre of debates on circular migration and mobility 
partnerships. Only those nationals from the non-EU state falling within the privileged categories 
of temporary migrants, seasonal migrants or the highly skilled will be allowed to benefit from 
the (circular) labour migration system and the rights to equality and protection once admitted for 
employment. Having the appropriate nationality will not be enough to fall within the personal 
scope of these instruments, as the skills and usefulness of the worker for the receiving state will 
also apply as further distinctions determining access to certain working conditions, protection 
and assistance, as well as other related fundamental human rights.
137 The narrowness of the 
personal scope also puts into question how much this circular system will at all reduce the 
incentives for irregular immigration among the rest of TCNs who are not qualified as ‘circular 
workers’.
138 Moreover, as Cholewinski (2006) has pertinently noted,  
[t]he growth in temporary work opportunities for migrants has resulted in a number of 
difficulties in ensuring their protection…migrant workers admitted on a short-term 
basis encounter obstacles, in particular to liberalise their employment opportunities and 
to access a secure residence status and the full range of social security in the country of 
employment. Therefore…the increase in temporary migrant labour is often 
accompanied by the proliferation of a confusing array of different legal statuses, which 
tend on the whole to dilute further the protections afforded such migrant workers in the 
country of employment.
139  
The temporary (and circular) nature emerging from the system of labour mobility provided by 
these partnerships along with the differential treatment it conveys opens up a whole range of 
questions about how the labour and human rights standards provided by various international 
and European human rights instruments are going to be protected on the ground. Among others, 
we highlight the relevance of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
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ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited”. Art. 15.3 stipulates that “[n]ationals of third countries who are authorized to work in the 
territories of the Member States are entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the 
Union”. See also Arts. 27-35 of Title IV on “Solidarity” in the Charter. 
138 For a critical account on the effects that circular migration is expected to have on irregular 
immigration, refer to A. Triandafyllidou, Attempting the Impossible? The Prospects and Limits of 
Mobility Partnerships and Circular Migration, ELIAMEP Thesis 1/2009, Hellenic Foundation for 
European & Foreign Policy, Athens, January 2009. 
139 See R. Cholewinski, “International Labour Law and the Protection of Migrant Workers: Revitalizing 
the Agenda in the Era of Globalization”, in J. Graig and S. Lynk (eds), Globalization and the Future of 
Labour Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 409-444. This was based on the findings 
of a previous study offering a review of the legal status of migrants admitted for employment purposes in 
a selection of European countries. See also R. Cholewinski, Migrant Workers in International Human 
Rights Law: Their Protection in Countries of Employment, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY | 35 
 
Workers,
140 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions 97
141 and 143,
142 and the 
European Social Charter.
143  Furthermore, the continual political resistance expressed in a 
substantial majority of EU member states towards acceding to and ratifying these instruments 
(along with other international and European instruments on labour migration and the human 
rights of third-country workers, e.g. the UN Migrant Workers Convention)
144 reveals the 
weakness at the nexus of circular labour migration and the mobility partnership regime at the 
EU level. More specifically, the overriding policy priority is fostering the security of the 
participating states and setting aside the rights of third-country workers. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the policy processes affecting the integration of EU labour 
immigration policies into the EU’s external relations, and more specifically the concept of 
circular migration emerging in the framework of mobility partnerships. Developments in the 
nexus between circular (employment-related) migration schemes and joint declarations with 
third countries on mobility partnerships have been justified at the EU official level as part of a 
necessary transition. The EU approach has moved from a classical, security-oriented one on 
international cooperation with third states on migration (focused on the management of irregular 
immigration – readmission – and border controls) towards a more ‘global, balanced and 
comprehensive’ one, which also includes initiatives facilitating legal channels for the labour-
related mobility of TCNs into the EU. We have argued that given the actual origins, rationale, 
conditional nature and kinds of (circular) labour migration policies advocated by mobility 
partnerships, the latter should be considered ‘security’ partnerships for the participating EU 
member states and to a limited extent the third countries. At the same time, they could be 
regarded as ‘insecurity’ partnerships for the coherency and legitimacy of the EU’s labour 
immigration policy, as well as the liberty and security of the third-country workers.  
The strategy to include labour immigration elements in the external facets of the EU’s 
immigration policy has mainly taken place because of the obstacles encountered by the 
European Commission in convincing non-EU countries to sign readmission agreements. Labour 
mobility is thus being instrumentalised in the EU’s external relations as a complementary 
                                                      
140 Council of Europe, European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, Strasbourg, 24 
November 1977. Refer for instance to Arts. 16 on “Conditions of Work” and 24 on “Expiry of Contract 
and Discharge”. Art. 16.2 states that “[i]t shall not be possible to derogate by individual contract from the 
principle of equal treatment referred to in the foregoing paragraph”. Refer to E. Guild, The European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers (1977): An Analysis of its Scope and Benefits, DO. 
CDMG (99) 11, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1999. 
141 See Art. 6 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning migration for 
employment, No. 97, revised 1949, Geneva. 
142 See Part II on “Equality of Opportunity and Treatment” in the ILO Convention concerning migrations 
in abusive conditions and the promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment of migrant workers, No. 
143, 1975, Geneva.  
143 See Council of Europe, European Social Charter, European Treaty Series No. 163, 3 May 1996, 
Strasbourg, Art. 19 on “The right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance”.  
144 See the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990. See also the 
Global Campaign for Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Migrants, Guide on Ratification of 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families, International Steering Committee, 2009 (retrieved from http://www.migrantsrights.org). 
According to this report, as of March 2009, 41 states had ratified the UN Migrant Workers’ Convention 
and 48 had ratified the ILO Conventions (Nos. 97, 23 and 143). 36 | CARRERA & HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA 
 
incentive in the promotion of the EU’s readmission policy. Indeed, since their inception, circular 
migration and mobility partnerships have been seen as potential responses, and even 
alternatives, to the phenomenon of irregular immigration. The predominance of security in the 
driving rationale of these partnerships is also evident in the levels of commitment that any non-
EU country will need to show to meet the eligibility criteria for a ‘mobility partner’. The 
readiness to cooperate on readmission and the management of irregular immigration functions 
as conditions for the non-EU country to benefit from any privileged treatment. Furthermore, the 
paper has argued that the kind of labour mobility foreseen in the framework of mobility 
partnerships can also be viewed as security-oriented. The mobility for employment purposes 
envisaged by the partnerships is guided by a logic that views mobility as circular, temporary and 
subject to selection – which mainly serves the national interests and political agendas of the 
participating EU member states while increasing the vulnerability of third-country workers.  
An evaluation of the circular migration initiatives for employment in the mobility partnerships 
with Moldova and Cape Verde has provided further evidence for our argument that they 
represent ‘insecurity’ partnerships in terms of the EU’s immigration policy and the rights of 
TCNs. These instruments give rise to major dilemmas for policy coordination, differentiation 
and coherence. The soft-policy nature of the joint declarations referring to the partnerships 
makes the European Commission’s task of coordinating them and ensuring their compatibility 
with the principles of rule of law and legal certainty a difficult one. The high degree of 
flexibility and differentiation in EU member state participation in these partnerships (along with 
the number of cooperation initiatives and bilateral agreements) challenge the consistency and 
legitimacy of the EU’s labour immigration policy, both internally and externally. THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S LABOUR IMMIGRATION POLICY | 37 
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